Sunday, July 31, 2005

???????:??????? ??????-????

???????:??????? ??????-????
中国浮动汇率制:要么博弈到最后 要么置身局外

NEWS.SOHU.COM   2005年07月19日08:18  第一财经日报

  近一段时间,人民币汇率浮动问题好像是个热点,它似乎与所有人利益相关。金融理论上,特别是在开放的宏观经济学框架下,汇率问题被认为是宏观中的宏观,是蒙代尔理论中铁三角的首位问题。汇率学12流派注定没有统一结论

  货币自身价格有两种表述形式:缘于人类耐性(时间偏好率)的利率和不同货币之间的互相测度——汇率。从蒙代尔-弗莱明分析框架开始,至今已有12种流派和分析框架来分析汇率决定,而第12个流派的汇率目标区理论也有好几代冲击模型分析框架,汇率决定理论如此多流派,从作为一门学科的视角,说明汇率学科的不成熟,汇率学科的不成熟导致人民币汇率浮动的讨论即使是严肃的,也只能是一家之言。

  作为群体性动物生活方式,本来不需要货币。比如,蚁群和猴子,但作为群体性、社会性人类生存,基于私有制的即时交换和基于投资与消费决策的跨时交易,作为节约交易成本的货币产生了。几乎在同一阶段,人类将贵金属作为货币或货币本位,这是对人类群体而言,需要一个普遍的价值测度符号:货币。

  作为个人而言,我们对事物价值的测度不必依赖于货币,比如你可以将午餐吃一市斤家养的小公鸡或你晚上7点会见情人的感觉(效用)作为您自己的测度基准(一般等价物),对所有事物进行价值衡量。在一个同质的世界里,我们也可以将上述感觉(效用)作为货币,在经济学的阿罗-德布罗理想世界中,是不需要货币的,或者说,我们可以将任何一种资产或消费品作为货币,在这里,人类自身发明的货币仅仅作为一种普通资产存在。

  在作为上个世纪第二次世界大战的产物——布雷顿森林体系解散之前,贵金属特别是黄金作为货币或货币本位存在,1976年牙买加体系之后,黄金非货币化,汇率制度多样化了,对应的是,多种汇率决定学术流派,出现了5次大的货币危机:差点毁了南美洲、亚洲和俄罗斯。当然,学术流派纷杂不是国际货币危机的原因,学术没有那么大的影响力。

  据近代货币史学资料,浮动汇率制并不是美国尼克松总统撕毁布雷顿森林体系而宣布黄金价格自由浮动才特有的,在大概1915~1943年,国际金本位体系瓦解,各国货币也是一个浮动汇率的,布雷顿森林体系便是对这一种浮动汇率的修正;据记载,那一次国际金本位体系(固定汇率制)的瓦解蛑皇腔平鹕隽坎蛔悖簿褪撬祷平鹗澜绮吭龀じ簧鲜澜缟瞎裆苤档脑龀ぃ鱿至鞫圆蛔愫屯ɑ踅羲醯奈侍猓搅颖仪急乙彩巧细鍪兰统醯囊桓鼍槎伞?/p>

  而据有的货币学家的分析,布雷顿森林体系(固定汇率制)的瓦解是美元对黄金定价过高,黄金被低估了,美元严重高估,上个世纪70年代美元危机时有个新闻报道:欧洲要饭的在要饭的牌子上写着,不要美元;然而,劣币依然驱除良币,结果是:美元大行其道,黄金非货币化了。有的货币学者分析,上个世纪90年代后期东南亚金融危机(主要是货币危机)是由于美元和日元的汇率巨额波动引致的。浮动汇率制并非市场化终极目标

  人类社会发展史告知我们:经济和社会的巨大发展与浮动汇率制度没有多大的相关关系和演进关系,国际浮动汇率制度其实是短暂的历史进程,牙买加浮动汇率体系4年之后(上个世纪80年代),就有学者提出恢复黄金本位制,欧洲那时就努力建立固定汇率制度,后来货币统一为欧元,据说现在其发行量超过了美元。

  事实上,经济和社会的发展缘自于技术和制度创新,在宏观经济学中我们称之为技术冲击和制度冲击,或广义的技术冲击。货币问题以及它们之间的比价——汇率问题不管是内生的还是外生的,至少它本身不是最重要的问题,当然,它也是制度冲击的一种,货币汇率的巨大波动而引致的金融危机和产业问题从而导致经济的巨大波动。

  在博弈论的分析框架下,最优的策略是:要么你有能力参与博弈到最后,要么做个局外人;在汇率的问题上,也许也是这个道理。人民币,以前紧盯美元,相当于作为美联储的第13个区存在,而目前国际贸易特别是亚洲国家——与中国贸易联系最紧密的地区之一,美元是个结算货币,当然中美贸易也是用美元结算的,人民币目前盯一下美元还是个最优选择。

  金本位的瓦解,纸本位的产生,各国货币(M2)发行量增加率远远大于其国民生产总值增长率,中国M2与GDP的比率更是个谜;这多余的货币,货币学者戏称之为迷失的货币,其实它并没有迷失,人们将其作为资产(财富)的一种而存储了,其中相当部分交付国际投资管理机构进行财富管理,据波士顿咨询公司统计,目前财富管理账户总额大约为20万亿~22万亿美元,这其中一部分投资于汇率波动;据瑞银全球财富管理公司业务资料,其在欧洲财富管理账户开户起点为3000万欧元,其部分组合投资于贵金属以及艺术品。大约有五种途径吸收多余的货币:资产(包含贵金属以及艺术品等,还有中间产品)价格上扬,消费品价格上涨,货币流通速度下降(货币自身作为财富窖藏等,这与货币定义有关的),金融衍生品交易,还有地下经济(黄、赌、毒、走私、逃税等)。部分游资寄生于浮动汇率制度

  巨大的国际投机游资,其实是纸本位和浮动汇率的产物,没有多少年的历史。部分游资依赖于浮动汇率制度而生存,浮动汇率制度和部分国际游资形成生态学上的共生关系。所谓华盛顿共识,国际游资究竟起了多大影响力,我们不得而知。

  蒙代尔教授有言,在人民币取得国际主要储备货币地位之前,盯住美元是目前宏观经济风险最小的选择;当然,在技术上,美国可以将人民币踢出美元区。有的学者提出:人民币将来与一篮子货币挂钩,篮子是灵活而机密的,新加坡汇率制度好像就是这样的。

  在适当的时候,中国联合欧洲建立包括黄金在内的贵金属本位制货币也许是个历史发展的选择,技术上而言不会出现通货不足的问题。但历史是路径依赖的,汇率制度政治化了。

  1999年,笔者曾参观巴黎的卢浮宫:40万幅名画,人类劳动遗产的精品,我想,其实那是伟大的法国人最后的货币本位:一举多得;作为生息资产(巨大的门票收入)以及提高国民包含自豪感在内的效用,比我们国民财富透过外汇储备大量持有某些国家国债强多了,还可以启迪民间富人的消费真正升级,也可减轻公安部门的压力:中国有些富人消费升级好像摆脱不了历史轮回(将嫖和赌作为消费升级)。可喜的是,中国部分富人已将艺术品作为其财富组合的一部分了。

  说到底,财富是在技术和制度变迁下,劳动所积累的,纸本位下的货币汇率是一个表象:很多时候不必管它。国际投资界之全球资产配置组合投资管理人(不包含全球宏观对冲基金),他们对股票积极投资组合中包含的汇率变动风险在具体操作上也是不进行对冲的。

  (作者系清华大学经济管理学院技术经济博士后,上海金融与法律研究院副院长兼企业研究所所长,本文不代表本报观点)

搜狗(www.sogou.com)搜索:“人民币升值”,共找到 1,121,304 个相关网页.

( 责任编辑:田瑛 )

http://business.sohu.com/20050719/n226357905.shtml

Daily Times - Site Edition

Daily Times - Site Edition
China says float mechanism to set yuan rate

BEIJING: China’s central bank governor said on Friday that recent trading in the yuan after last week’s revaluation showed the currency reflected supply and demand as well as moves in other currencies.

Last week the People’s Bank of China revalued the yuan, also called the renminbi, by 2.1 percent, setting its value at 8.11 against the dollar and saying the exchange rate would be set with reference to a currency basket.

“The renminbi has begun normal floating, reflecting market supply and demand and changes in the exchange rates of major currencies in international markets,” Zhou Xiaochuan said in a statement on the central bank’s Web site (www.pbc.gov.cn).

The narrow range of trading in the yuan over the past week has been a small fraction of the 0.3 percent allowed under the new regime, leading many analysts to believe that the central bank is not allowing market forces to play their full role.

But Zhou’s remarks came shortly after the yuan closed at a post-revaluation high for the second straight session, extending tiny gains as the central bank stood by and gave the currency leeway to rise. The yuan closed at 8.1056 to the dollar.

A “floating mechanism”, not official adjustments, would drive moves in the yuan, and yuan’s exchange rate would fluctuate based on “objective rules”, Zhou said. He also reiterated that an earlier statement of his describing the revaluation as an “initial adjustment”, referred to the overall process of reforming the currency regime and did not indicate that further revaluations were planned. reuters

Thursday, July 28, 2005

???:?????????_????_????_???

???:?????????_????_????_???梅新育:人民币汇率调整分析
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

http://finance.sina.com.cn 2005年07月28日 14:41 新浪财经
  梅新育

  中国政府果然兑现了其人民币汇率调整“出其不意”的预言,21日晚19点零1分,国内外市场上喧嚣近3年之久的“人民币升值论”突然成为现实,一纸《中国人民银行关于完善人民币汇率形成机制改革的公告》(中国人民银行公告〔2005〕第 16 号)宣告人民币汇率形成机制和汇率水平均发生了变动,我国自2005年7月21日起开始实行以市场供求为基础、参考一篮子货币进行调节、有管理的浮动汇率制度,实施10年之久的非正式盯住美元汇率制度寿终正寝,形成了更富弹性的人民币汇率机制;美元对人民币交易价格自公告发布之时起调整为1美元兑8.11元人民币。这条消息注定是本月全世界最大的经济新闻、今年全世界最大的经济新闻之一,也很有可能成为日后经济学教科书上政策博弈的经典案例。

  一、为什么说此次人民币汇率调整“出其不意”?

  之所以说这次汇率调整“出其不意”,是因为它发生在热钱内流减缓甚至开始出现流出东亚的趋势、而外汇市场上人民币升值压力也有缓解趋向之时。

  首先,我们用下面这个简单的方程式计算内流热钱规模:

  内流热钱=外汇储备增量-海关统计贸易顺差-实际利用外商直接投资

  其中,贸易顺差之所以用海关统计数据而不用国际收支口径数据,是因为在存在汇率变动预期的时候,大量的“提前错后”操作将使后者严重失真,掺杂进许多变相资本流动。如去年我国海关统计口径贸易顺差为320.97亿美元,国际收支统计口径下的货物贸易顺差则高达589.82亿美元,比海关统计高出将近269亿美元,其中有很大一部分系国外买方提前向国内预付货款(甚至纯属无真实贸易背景的支付)、国内卖方推迟向国外支付所致。用上述方程式我们计算得出以下结果:

  2004年热钱内流数额=2067亿美元-321亿美元-606亿美元=1140亿美元,月均95亿美元;

  2005上半年热钱内流数额=1010亿美元-397亿美元-286亿美元=327亿美元,月均54.5亿美元,比去年月均热钱内流数额减少近一半。

  其次,近期从银行间外汇市场到场外外汇市场上,人民币升值压力均有所减轻。银行间外汇市场人民币升值压力的表现是外汇交易成交量下降。整个上半年,银行间外汇市场日均成交量为11.98亿美元,而6月当月日均成交量为11.70亿美元, 即6月当月出现了外汇成交量下降的趋势。在银行的零售市场上,近来不少银行反映以外币兑换人民币的数量显著减少,更多的是外币币种之间的调整。在非正规市场上,据新闻媒体报道,最近一两个月外汇“黄牛”的业务也清淡了许多。

  第三,从海尔、中国移动到中海油,最近中国大企业频频在海外发起收购行动,规模空前扩大,在一些市场参与者眼里,这也是近期人民币汇率不会调整的迹象。麦肯锡(McKinsey)大中华区总裁欧高敦(Gordon Orr)在7月19日的英国《金融时报》上撰文阐述了这种分析思路:许多中国大企业首脑与政府最高层关系密切,很多人本身就来自权力机构。如中国移动总经理王建宙在进入电信企业之前就是信息产业部综合规划司司长。这些中国高管不会希望自己遭到同行笑话,即只要他们稍有耐心,海外收购价格就会因人民币升值而便宜许多。因此,如果人民币汇率近期会发生调整,这些信息灵通的中国大企业就会暂停在国外进行如此大规模的投资和并购交易,或是因为预期有更加强劲的人民币支持而乐意为海外并购支付更高的以美元计价的价格,但几乎没有证据表明汇率考虑因素影响了中国企业海外收购的价格或时机,亦即这些信息灵通的中国大企业高管们也并不认为人民币汇率会在近期调整。

  二、此次人民币汇率调整负面影响不会太大

  人民币汇率调整确属势在必行。在汇率形成机制方面,实施10年之久的人民币盯住美元汇率制度对我国外经贸发展和国内价格稳定都发挥了积极的促进作用,但也存在多方面消极影响,包括形成对发达国家(主要是美国)的财富转移、损害货币政策独立性、更有利于出口部门而相对抑制国内部门……,等等。归根结底,一个独立经济强国不可能是将本币与外币挂勾的国家,人民币汇率制度必然需要调整。在汇率水平方面,中国经济的持续快速增长也必然导致人民币汇率水涨船高。近两年的人民币汇率之争,所争者绝非人民币汇率是否应当调整,而是如何调整,即调整的时机、幅度和节奏。

  从正面来看,人民币汇率调整的主要正面影响是有利于缓解对外贸易不平衡,改善贸易条件,扩大内需,增强货币政策独立性,提高金融调控的主动性和有效性;促使企业转变经营机制,增强自主创新能力,加快转变外贸增长方式,提高国际竞争力和抗风险能力;有利于优化利用外资结构,提高利用外资效果;等等。

  从负面来看,由于以下原因,就总体而言,只要短期内不继续大幅度提高汇率,这次汇率调整对我国外经贸和整个经济的冲击就不会太大。

  首先,此次升值幅度很小,对美元升值幅度仅1.9%,而此前普遍预期的是只要升值幅度在5%左右就完全能够承受。相比之下,当年《广场协议》之后日元升值的幅度要大得多,节奏也相当紧密:1985年9月20日—24日,日元对美元汇率为240~230︰1;9月22日,西方五国(美国、日本、联邦德国、英国、法国)财政部长和中央银行行长签署《广场协议》(Plaza Accord);24日—27日,日元汇率上升到230~220︰1,升值幅度约4.2%;9月27日—11月1日,日元汇率为220~210︰1;……到1987年12月11日—1988年1月4日,日元对美元汇率已经上升到130~121.65︰1,即在两年时间内,日元对美元汇率几乎翻了一番。因此,人民币汇率调整的负面冲击即使存在,也不会太大。

  其次,此次汇率调整的配套措施限制了其负面冲击。这次人民币汇率波动幅度并未扩大,现阶段每日银行间外汇市场美元对人民币的交易价仍在人民银行公布的美元交易中间价上下千分之三的幅度内浮动。与此同时,继5月20日将一年期美元、港币存款利率上限分别提高0.25个百分点和01875个百分点之后,人民银行宣布从7月22日起上调境内商业银行美元、港币小额外币存款利率上限,一年期美元、港币存款利率上限均提高0.5个百分点,调整后利率上限分别为1.625%和1.5%。此举增加了外币投资机会,提高了人民币投资的机会成本,削弱了境内居民将自有外币计价资产转换为人民币的内在动机,从而有助于稳定汇率,遏制人民币汇率进一步上调的趋势。

  第三,汇率变动对不同贸易方式的影响不一样,对一般贸易出口影响大,对“大进大出”的加工贸易进出口的影响在很大程度上自相抵销,而我国对外贸易至今仍以加工贸易为主,加工贸易、尤其是加工贸易出口占我国外贸实绩的一半以上。

  第四,今年前6个月我国连续出现了可观的贸易顺差,截至6月末,我国外贸进出口总值6450.3亿美元,同比增长23.2%,其中出口3423.4亿美元,增长32.7%;进口3026.9亿美元,增长14%;累计贸易顺差396.5亿美元。1994—2004年,我国连续11年贸易顺差,贸易顺差最高纪录是1998年的434.75亿美元,其次依次是1997年的404.22亿美元、2004年的320.97亿美元、2002年的304.26亿美元;今年上半年贸易顺差已经超过去年全年顺差总额,接近年度贸易顺差历史最高纪录,实为空前未有。预计全年贸易顺差可望超过1000亿美元,比此前的年度贸易顺差最高纪录翻一番以上。与此同时,今年上半年我国外汇储备增加1010亿美元,同比多增337亿美元,6月末外汇储备余额为7110亿美元,同比增长51.1%。而且,目前我国主要贸易伙伴如美国等经济增长势头良好,吸收我国货物、服务出口的能力仍然较强。在这种情况下,汇率调整即使对我国国际收支有负面影响,也只不过是缓解我国贸易顺差和外汇储备过快增长的压力,而不至于导致我国贸易收支发生根本性转折。

  其实,今年上半年美元汇率总体上颇为强势,去年12月欧元创造了1.36美元的汇率最高纪录,目前对美元汇率已经一路下跌到1.20美元左右,即美元对欧元汇率已经上涨10%以上,非正式盯住美元的人民币对欧元汇率随之也上涨了10%以上,但上半年我国对货币汇率相对疲软的欧盟贸易仍然持续高增长,上半年对欧盟出口增幅39.2%,进口增幅仅1.7%,贸易额1000.5亿美元,顺差高达316亿美元,以至于欧洲厂商要对公认为受人民币汇率调整冲击最大的中国纺织品、鞋类发起特别保障措施,并对其他几类中国货物发起反倾销,已经足以说明我国出口厂商的抗冲击能力不可低估。

  第五,中国引进的外资中有很大一部分属于对出口导向型企业的投资,不少人担心人民币升值将提高中国的成本,从而削弱其对外资的吸引力和出口产品的价格竞争力。鉴于今年上半年我国实际利用外商直接投资285.63亿美元,同比下降3.18%,这种担忧显得非常现实。对此,我国内地可以作好充分准备抓住一部分投资从沿海转移的机遇,从而部分化解成本上升的冲击。由于内需扩大,我国对外资的吸引力还会增强。正如经合组织(OECD)6月23日发布的《外国直接投资与近期发展》(Trends and Recent Developments in Foreign Direct Investment)报告指出的那样,对于OECD之外的发展中国家而言,市场导向型的国际直接投资越来越多,国际投资者在选择投资地点时不仅是在选择低成本的生产地点,而且越来越多地是在选择接近庞大的消费市场。这意味着人口众多且国民收入持续稳定增长的国家更能够得到外资的青睐。而且,从长远看,我国利用外资工作必须更多地依靠高效率的公共服务、优质基础设施、完善的产业配套、无与伦比的规模经济效益、优秀的人力资源等造就核心竞争力,而不是片面依赖低廉的劳动力成本取胜于一时。

  再说,外商直接投资下降可能不过是一个伪命题,因为近两个月外资同比略有下降未必等于全年外资流入下降,我们没有必要过分关注几个月的数字,因为货物贸易、实质经济部门与虚拟经济部门不同,不是几个月甚至几个小时就能决定最终盈亏命运的。即使今年利用外资总额下降,最主要的原因恐怕也是因为从2002年开始上行的中国经济面临转折,宏观经济的波动我们无法彻底消除,只能依靠扩大内需、特别是国内消费来缓解。我们应当明了,正如一个国家的投资不可能永远高涨一样,一个国家的外资流入也不可能逐年甚至逐月递增,有所起伏是正常现象。如果我们不顾经济基本面和利弊得失,在任何时候都强求外资持续增长,结果只会招致我们无法承受的代价。归根结底,一个大国可持续发展的希望只能寄托在本国国民和本国资本积累上。

  第六,在人民币升值条件下,已有海外投资存量面临按人民币计价价值“缩水”的风险。根据目前的升值幅度和企业行动来看,这个风险存在,但不会太大,因为在已经持续近3年的“人民币升值论”压力下,不少企业和金融机构已经做了相应的调整,从最近两年的《中国国际收支平衡表》中就可以看出来。如2004年我国境内机构减持境外有价证券资产,使《2004年中国国际收支平衡表》上该项目实现资金净回流64.86亿美元,比2003年净回流多增35.03亿美元,且境内金融机构是减持我国境外证券资产的主体,反映了近两年我国金融机构调整境内外资产匹配,优化境外投资资产的情况。

  第七,人民币汇率升值最大的风险之一是其潜在的通货紧缩效应,但上半年我国价格仍然在温和上涨,尽管涨幅比去年有所下降,因此其通货紧缩效应的负面影响也不至于太大。

  当然,人民币汇率调整对不同行业的影响不一样,总体而言,对于纺织品等轻工行业影响较大;对进口原料较多的钢铁行业应该属于利好;进口数量巨大的能源行业其进口以人民币计价也会下降;汽车行业也应当受到一定的降价压力,因为不仅其进口元件以人民币计价降价了,而且钢铁等投入品的成本也会因此而降低。

  三、迎接人民币升值的机遇

  人民币汇率调整不仅是挑战,同时也是机遇。这种机遇首先体现为内需扩大,国内市场机会增多。

  其次,人民币升值将驱使沿海一部分资本转移,我国内地如果能够在公共服务、基础设施、产业配套、人力资源等方面切实加以改进,这不失为发展契机。

  第三,人民币升值将促使我们扩大资本设备和战略资源进口(建立重要资源战略储备)和对外直接投资,特别是促进中国企业对海外的直接投资,因为人民币升值增强了中国企业的资本实力,促使一些中国企业到海外寻求低成本生产地点;为减轻外汇储备高速增长和人民币进一步升值的压力,政府也会进一步放松对企业赴海外投资的管制。事实上,今年中国企业也掀起了海外投资(特别是海外并购)的高潮。不过,在这方面,我们也应防止陷入误区。一方面,目前国际市场初级产品价格仍然高位运行,我们不宜此时大幅度提升战略资源进口以建立战略储备,应当等到价格下跌时候再说。另一方面,扩大对外投资要避免其沦为资本外逃黑洞,或是低估投资风险,留下一大堆投资失败的烂帐。

点击此处查询全部人民币汇率新闻
http://finance.sina.com.cn/economist/jingjixueren/20050728/14411843722.shtml

??????????????????_????_????_???

??????????????????_????_????_???李扬和余维彬谈人民币汇率机制改革问题
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

http://finance.sina.com.cn 2005年07月28日 11:21 金时网·金融时报   主持人:本报记者 付平

  特邀嘉宾:社科院金融所所长 李扬

  社科院金融所副研究员 余维彬

  2005年7月21日,中国人民银行发布公告:自当日起,中国将实行以市场供求为基础、参考一篮子货币进行调节、有管理的浮动汇率制度。记者就此采访了中国社科院金融所所长李扬和副研究员余维彬。

  主持人:应该如何评价本次汇率改革?

  李扬:央行7月21日的公告表明,中国以回归有管理浮动的方式,正式启动了人民币汇率机制弹性化改革。此次改革有很多可圈可点之处。

  首先是时机的选择。当前我国经济运行平稳健康、美元汇率止跌回稳、中国与美欧贸易摩擦开始走上谈判解决的途径等,为人民币汇率改革提供了相对稳定的国际环境;更重要的是,经过近3年的反复讨论,国内各界对人民币汇率改革所涉及的主要领域和主要问题,包括目标、条件、步骤、影响、利弊等,均已有了相当程度的了解并逐渐有所准备。在上述国内外环境下启动汇率改革,应当说是震动较小的。

  其次是改革的方向。此次改革确定了回归有管理浮动的安排。从汇率制度的运行特征来看,有管理的浮动是一种仅次于独立浮动的非常接近完全市场化的汇率制度。中国选择这种制度来启动改革,无疑为进一步的改革确定了合理的框架和理性的发展方向。

  但是,鉴于人民币汇率改革的长期性和复杂性,改革的步伐启动后,我们就应全面估量改革深入后可能产生的新问题,并为解决这些问题制定预案。其中,通过加快改革,逐步完善弹性汇率制度得以正常运行的体制、机制和技术环境,更显得至关重要。

  主持人:应该怎样理解本次汇率改革的要点?

  余维彬:实行有管理的浮动、在操作上参考一篮子货币以及变动人民币汇率平价,是本次汇率改革的三个要点。对于这项改革,首先需要关注的是上述三个要点之间的主从次序的排列———强调改革的立足点是实行有管理的浮动,而一篮子货币只是操作的参考,堪称深思熟虑。我们可以从以下四个方面来分析这种安排的合理性。

  首先,国际货币基金组织目前将全球的汇率安排分为8类,依市场化程度由低而高依次为:无单独法定货币的汇率、货币局安排;传统的盯住(包括盯住单一货币和盯住一篮子货币)、水平区间盯住、爬行盯住、爬行区间;有管理浮动、独立浮动。在这个菜单上,有管理的浮动被排在仅次于独立(完全)浮动的市场化程度相当高的位置上。这是因为,从运行特征上看,有管理的浮动汇率制度是一种可以容纳巨大变化的较具弹性的制度。鉴于此,我国的汇率制度改革直接进入有管理的浮动,而不是选择盯住一篮子,为我国汇率制度的市场化改革确定了较高的起点,并开辟了比较宽广的发展空间。

  第二,强调回归有管理的浮动,而将一篮子货币仅仅摆在参考的位置上,在战略上也很明智:它使得我国货币当局从被动应付(维持“盯住”的承诺)改变为主动出击(对外不承诺任何的汇率平价)。这种地位的转换,对汇率改革的顺利推进极为重要。事实上,人民币汇率制度改革面临两大问题,一是如何改;二是在改革的过程中如何尽可能弱化投机资本的冲击。从策略上看,能否弱化投机资本的冲击,不仅决定着改革启动的时机,而且可能决定改革的成败。实行有管理的浮动,即在制度上公开宣称人民币不同任何单一货币或“篮子货币”保持盯住关系,将使得投机资本对人民币汇率的冲击失去依凭,从而使我国货币当局在同投机资本的博弈中获得主动权。

  第三,在金融全球化日益深入的背景下,实行任何形式的固定汇率制(包括盯住一篮子货币)均将弱化货币政策效力。实行浮动汇率,对外不承诺维持任何汇率水平,将使货币政策得以最大限度地充分发挥作用,从而可以比较从容地根据国内经济发展的需要来制定货币政策和管理汇率水平。特别需要指出的是,“参考一篮子货币”来进行操作和“盯住一篮子货币”看似接近,实际上的差别是相当大的。所谓“盯住一篮子货币”,指的是按照选定的货币种类和权重来确定一个抽象的篮子货币的价值,并将人民币盯住该货币价值的一种安排。在这里,一国货币当局基本没有汇率定价主动权,而且必须承担盯住的义务。而若仅仅将“篮子货币”的功能定位在参考的位置上,则货币当局没有了盯住的义务,从而可以根据国内经济和金融形势以及外汇市场的供求关系来主动灵活地调整汇率的定价基础。

  第四,此次汇率制度的调整还体现在人民币对各单个外币的定价机制上。根据方案,改革后,“人民币汇率不再盯住单一美元”,而“非美元货币对人民币的交易价在人民银行公布的该货币交易中间价上下一定幅度内浮动。”这里的安排是值得品味的。众所周知,改革前的人民币汇率制度,既表现为人民币的汇率盯住美元,同时也表现为人民币对其他货币的汇率主要根据美元对各该货币的汇率而套算得出。这使得人民币对其他货币的汇率随美元对这些货币汇率的变化而变化———这才出现了前两年美元对各主要货币的汇率一路走低,而人民币对这些货币的汇率也随之一路贬值的情况。此次改革安排表明:人民币对其他可交易货币的汇率决定,从此也脱离了其与美元汇率的中介关系,开始走上了相对独立的浮动安排。

  主持人:人民币汇率机制弹性化改革后可能会遇到哪些问题?

  李扬:我认为,在短期内,有三个问题需要充分注意。

  第一,汇率制度改革对国民经济运行的各个层面和各个领域的影响,一时还很难充分、准确估计。但是,有一点可以确定:汇率制度的变动对国民经济的不同层面、不同领域的影响是各不相同的。这就需要我们在认真研究的基础上,针对各领域所受到的不同影响,一方面调整发展战略,争取在国际分工的新格局中取得更为牢固的比较优势;另一方面,根据各行业得失之差别,适当给予(如果需要)政策支持。据中信证券研究,汇率制度改革后,受到正面影响的国内行业主要包括:造纸、中药品牌、零售、餐饮、旅游服务、航线和机场、公路、银行、房地产、电力(部分)等;受影响较小的行业主要包括:煤炭、建筑材料、航空和国防、饮料、食品、医药、铁路、电信等;而受到负面影响较大的主要行业则有:石油和天然气、化学工业、金属、电子和电器设备、机械设备、仪器仪表、汽车、服装纺织、家庭耐用品、贸易、水运和港口、信息技术(软硬件)等。显然,人民币汇率改革之后,我们需要组织强大的力量来展开类似的研究,而这正是我们目前缺乏的。

  第二,汇率制度改革启动后,政府、广大金融机构、工商企业和居民所面临的汇率风险无疑现实化了。因此,迅速建立有效的外汇市场,推出各种防范汇率风险的衍生产品市场,便以极为紧迫的形式提上了议事日程。

  第三,由于国内经济结构尚存在较大的扭曲,由于政府、广大金融机构、工商企业和居民尚不熟悉汇率的波动,由于与之相应的制度安排———如统计、会计、税收、财政等———尚未充分考虑新的汇率环境而作出调整,整个中国经济一时很难承受汇率的剧烈波动。因此,如果说改变对美元的盯住状态十分重要且十分紧迫的话,那么,在这种变动过程中保持人民币汇率的稳定,至少具有同等的重要性。正是在这个意义上,我赞同对浮动汇率实行管理,而管理的目标则是保持汇率水平的基本稳定。因此,我们认真研究诸如日本等国家的汇率管理经验,就有了相当程度的紧迫性。

  从长期看,“货币错配”风险将是我们面临的主要问题。越来越多的研究者认识到,货币错配是发展中国家实行汇率改革的最主要障碍,因为,它的存在,可能使发展中国家的任何改革都进退失据。因此,通过多方面的改革来创造有利于管理货币错配风险的制度体系,应成为我们下一步的主要任务。

点击此处查询全部汇率改革新闻
http://finance.sina.com.cn/economist/jingjixueren/20050728/11211843283.shtml

Wednesday, July 27, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - DocumentCopyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 23, 2005 Saturday
USA Edition 2

SECTION: FT MONEY - MARKETS WEEK; Pg. 11

LENGTH: 641 words

HEADLINE: Renminbi revaluation just 'first small step' GLOBAL OVERVIEW

BYLINE: By DAVE SHELLOCK

BODY:


Currencies were the focus for financial markets this week as investors digested news that China was revaluing the renminbi and the latest words of wisdom from Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve chairman.

By contrast, equities were little moved over the week with markets for the most part brushing aside another series of terrorist incidents in London.

China announced it was revaluing the renminbi by 2.1 per cent against the dollar and said it would replace its peg to the US unit with a basket of currencies.

The move was given a mixed response by analysts.

"We view this as a positive event for the global economy and for equity markets and one that reinforces our bullish cyclical calls across the region on the back of improving global industrial activity," said Goldman Sachs.

But Steve Barrow, currency economist at Bear Stearns, said the move was very much in line with expectations.

"In this regard, it is not a big deal," he said. "It is more like the first small step on the long path to significant renminbi appreciation.

"The main conclusion as far as we are concerned is that, if the US wants this change to result in a lower dollar/renminbi, it will have to accept, or even encourage, a weaker dollar against other major currencies such as the euro and yen."

The greenback duly tumbled against the yen before staging a modest recovery yesterday. The yen made strong gains against sterling and the euro.

Analysts said the yen would benefit from expectations that a strong renminbi would prompt other Asian countries to allow their

currencies to appreciate, boosting Japanese competitiveness.

US Treasury bonds also suffered a sharp sell-off following the news from Beijing, with analysts suggesting the revaluation could weigh on Chinese purchases of US bonds.

The yield on the 10-year Treasury bond drifted back yesterday but was still up sharply from levels seen at the start of the week.

Bond yields were also pushed up by the other big market event of the week - Mr Greenspan's midweek testimony on monetary policy to Congress.

He gave an upbeat assessment of the US economy and confirmed that, as expected, interest rates would continue to be raised to keep inflation at bay.

The question of how high the US central bank raises borrowing costs is one of the uncertainties facing the market, particularly with increasingly robust US house prices fuelling consumer spending.

Ian Harwood, global head of economics and strategy at Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, believes it is very unlikely that rates will be raised specifically to deflate home prices.

"The Fed didn't act thus vis-a-vis the late 1990s equity bubble and, crucially, subsequently argued it was right to behave as it did," he said.

"Fed officials, moreover, continue to deny the existence of a housing bubble, though, interestingly, they are now talking in terms of 'froth'."

World equity markets put in mixed performances. Wall Street was little changed over the week as the quarterly US reporting season got into full swing. At the close yesterday, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was up 0.2 per cent while the S&P 500 was up by the same percentage.

The Nasdaq Composite index inched up 0.1 per cent following positive earnings news from the technology bellwether IBM.

European stocks touched a three-year high on Tuesday but subsequently retreated to end the week virtually unchanged.

In Asia, Tokyo's Nikkei 225 Average slipped 0.5 per cent. Car stocks fell back sharply yesterday following the renminbi's revaluation.

Elsewhere in the region, Australian and Indonesian shares hit record highs, while Singapore was boosted by a loosening of restrictions on property lending.

Oil prices fell steadily through the week before staging a modest rebound yesterday.

Another large build in US distillate inventories plus a weakening of Hurricane Emily were behind the drop in crude prices.

LOAD-DATE: July 22, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Copyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 23, 2005 Saturday
London Edition 1

SECTION: FT MONEY - MARKETS WEEK UK; Pg. 19

LENGTH: 540 words

HEADLINE: Speculation abounds on China's next move CURRENCIES

BYLINE: By STEVE JOHNSON

BODY:


A decision by China to finally bite the bullet and scrap the renminbi's increasingly controversial decade-long peg to the dollar sent ripples through the currency market this week.

Beijing has come under mounting pressure from the US and other trading partners to revalue its currency, while rampant growth and fears of asset price bubbles in China also pointed to currency appreciation as a way of dampening economic conditions.

But Thursday's move still caught traders on the back foot, with most analysts expecting a revaluation later in the year.

Beijing revalued the renminbi by 2.1 per cent to Rmb8.11 to the dollar and introduced a new managed float against an unspecified basket of currencies, mirroring a system already employed by Singapore.

Many analysts believe that either there will be further revaluations to come or that China will allow its currency to creep higher. The renminbi is allowed to fluctuate by up to 0.3 per cent against the dollar each day.

However, if the latter theory is true, Beijing seems intent on allowing the market to settle down first. Yesterday the renminbi closed slightly lower at Rmb8.1111, with the People's Bank intervening to stop it strengthening from its opening level.

"It would be absolutely wrong for China to allow the currency to strengthen immediately because it would encourage speculative forces," said Hans Redeker, head of currency strategy at BNP Paribas.

Mr Redeker forecasts that Beijing will allow the renminbi to firm to 7.9 to the dollar by the year-end, with a second revaluation next year taking it to 7.5.

UBS sees 7.95 by December and 7.75 by the end of 2006, while a more conservative Bank of America believes the renminbi will end 2005 at 8.11 to the dollar, before being allowed to firm to 7.89 by June 2006. As of yesterday, 12-month non-deliverable forward contracts were pricing in a rate of 7.6989.

China's move was immediately followed by Malaysia, which ditched its dollar peg and announced a managed float for the ringgit. However, intervention was again yesterday's theme with the Bank Negara Malaysia limiting ringgit gains to 0.7 per cent at MDollars 3.775 to the dollar.

The long-awaited Chinese revaluation is seen as lifting all of Asia's managed currencies, with central banks able to allow appreciation against western currencies without losing competitiveness against China.

Two currencies that missed out on gains on Thursday rose yesterday, with the South Korean won firming 1.5 per cent to Won1,020 to the dollar and the Taiwan dollar gaining 1.3 per cent to TDollars 31.54, with both countries again said to be intervening to limit gains.

However, the yen, which led Asian currencies higher on Thursday, handed back some gains with the realisation Beijing was not allowing further renminbi gains. The Japanese currency ended the week up 0.7 per cent at Y134.06 to the euro, 1 per cent at Y111.06 to the dollar and 1.7 per cent to Y193.30 against sterling.

The Australian dollar rose 2.3 per cent to Dollars 0.7658 against the greenback over the week, aided by China's increased purchasing power for its commodities.

Sterling was the week's big loser. The pound fell 0.6 per cent to Dollars 1.7408 against the dollar and 1 per cent to Pounds 0.6935 against the euro.

LOAD-DATE: July 22, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Copyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 23, 2005 Saturday
London Edition 1

SECTION: LEADER; Pg. 10

LENGTH: 571 words

HEADLINE: Long (un)winding road China points the way to dealing with global imbalances

BODY:


China's move to a more flexible currency regime opens the door to a serious international effort to tackle global imbalances and reduce the giant US current account deficit, now running at an annualised rate of nearly Dollars 800bn (Pounds 456bn). This is in everyone's interests. The US cannot borrow from abroad at this rate for ever, and the sooner the adjustment begins the less likely it is to end in global recession.

But on its own this week's move will have little impact. To make serious inroads into global imbalances, four things need to happen. China has to allow the renminbi to appreciate much further, other Asian currencies have to move in tandem, the US has to increase savings and the rest of the world has to boost domestic demand to compensate.

The initial 2 per cent revaluation will have no discernible effect. Calculations by Ken Rogoff and Maurice Obstfeld, two economists, suggest that the renminbi would have to rise by 20 per cent over two years as part of a broader adjustment to halve the US deficit.

Moreover, renminbi appreciation will have the desired effect only if other Asian currencies also rise. Otherwise lower imports from China would simply be replaced by higher imports from the rest of Asia. The Asian Development Bank estimates that if China alone revalued by 20 per cent the US current account deficit would improve by only 0.05 per cent.

Pan-Asian revaluation is likely. The priority for most Asian countries is

not to preserve a fixed rate against

the dollar, but to ensure stable ­intra-Asian exchange rates. However,

even a 20 per cent revaluation

by all Asian countries would not solve the US current account problem, though it would make a ­sizeable dent.

It needs to be ­accompanied by changes to underlying patterns of demand.

As Asian currencies appreciate, their policymakers should stimulate domestic demand by lowering interest rates, raising spending and/or cutting taxes. This would increase imports and reduce surplus savings.

If and when this process gets under way in earnest, the US should move aggressively to increase its national savings, by raising taxes or cutting spending. Public finances have improved this year, but adjusted for the economic cycle, not much.

In the long run, to the extent that Asian countries allow their currencies to rise against the dollar they will have less need to intervene to buy dollar assets, putting upward pressure on US long-term interest rates. By reducing the government deficit, policymakers could offset the effect of this on the productive private sector.

There are risks in moving away from the old market equilibrium, which was stable in the short term, even if unsustainable in the long term. Abrupt reserve diversification by Asian central banks, or the fear of it, could trigger a sharp sell-off of US bonds and the ­dollar by private investors.

Conversely, expectations of future revaluation are likely to generate a wave of speculative capital flows into Asia. Currencies of countries with relatively open capital accounts could appreciate rapidly. If Asian central banks want to slow the rise, they may have to increase, temporarily, their purchases of US dollar assets.

Yet the risks of adjusting now are less than those of adjusting later. The best way to minimise the risks is to ensure the process does not get stalled half way - with limited adjustment in Asia and no response from the US. Alas, that seems all too likely.

LOAD-DATE: July 22, 2005

Copyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - DocumentCopyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 23, 2005 Saturday
London Edition 1

SECTION: LEX COLUMN; Pg. 14

LENGTH: 248 words

HEADLINE: Renminbi THE LEX COLUMN:

BODY:


It's a regime change, but not as we know it. The world's biggest centrally planned economy has taken a step towards floating its currency.

But as a trigger for a mass revaluation of Asian currencies - a reversal of the 1997 round of devaluations - it does not quite cut the mustard.

Further renminbi revaluation is likely, but speculators will need patience: the new regime is more crawling peg than hybrid float. The 0.3 per cent daily fluctuation up or down already existed - it is not a new feature. The make-up of the new basket is not disclosed, but restricting it to China's three biggest trading partners would give roughly equal weighting between the dollar, euro and yen. That looks too radical, given the extent of trade with dollar-bloc countries. Instead, near term, the dollar will probably be the main determinant.

The response of regional currencies was fittingly half-hearted. Yesterday, the yen unwound part of its initial gains. There is room for appreciation - recent dollar strength means Asian currencies lagged the renminbi by between 3 per cent and 10 per cent in the past six months - but it will probably be modest. Renminbi appreciation does little to blunt China's cost advantage over most of its neighbours. Asian central banks can afford to intervene if appreciation runs beyond their comfort levels: reserve accumulation has slowed, and benign inflation reduces the need for hefty sterilisation. Asian currencies, like the renminbi, are set to crawl not sprint.

LOAD-DATE: July 22, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Copyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 23, 2005 Saturday
London Edition 1

SECTION: LEX COLUMN; Pg. 14

LENGTH: 247 words

HEADLINE: Managed floats THE LEX COLUMN:

BODY:


The history of managed floats is not a happy one. Japan, more than most, still bears the scars. Rapid appreciation, touched off by the Nixon shock in 1971 and compounded by the 1985 Plaza Accord, was followed by massive asset bubbles and eventually Japan's "lost decade".

There is little likelihood of China treading a similar path, however, with its respect for history and the tools to avoid many of the pitfalls. Unlike Japan, its initial reluctance to adopt a more flexible currency regime has not sparked strong inflation - indeed, price growth is comfortably low. China is moving from a platform of strength, and has conceded little - a one-off 2.1 per cent appreciation and managed float against an undisclosed basket of currencies. Armed with capital controls and cash, it still calls the shots. Yesterday, the renminbi remained at its new peg of 8.11 to the dollar, thanks to hefty central bank intervention.

But asset bubbles will still flourish. Speculative flows into Asian assets have started to return, banking on currency appreciation across the region. Hong Kong, in particular, looks vulnerable. Liquidity targeting China's capitalist enclave as a renminbi proxy drives interest rates lower, fuelling further demand for Hong Kong stocks and property - and, paceJapan, raising the spectre of bad loans when the trend reverses. Nascent property bubbles in Shanghai and South Korea are likely to inflate further. Even the best-managed float cannot eliminate speculation.

LOAD-DATE: July 22, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Copyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 23, 2005 Saturday
London Edition 1

SECTION: COMMENT & ANALYSIS; Pg. 11

LENGTH: 1274 words

HEADLINE: The drivers of the rate of change MEN IN THE NEWS WEN JIABAO and Zhou Xiaochuan: The renminbi revaluation has shown divergent approaches to modernising China, write Richard McGregor and Mure Dickie

BYLINE: By MURE DICKIE and RICHARD MCGREGOR

BODY:


At his annual news conference in March, Wen Jiabao, China's usually dour premier, promised mischievously that any revaluation of his country's currency would come as a surprise to the markets.

Mr Wen's efforts were only partly successful, however. China's move to a more flexible exchange rate has been in the works for so long, and the revaluation itself was so small - just 2.1 per cent against the US dollar - that it caused little shock when it came on Thursday evening in Beijing.

Indeed, the announcement by the People's Bank of China, the central bank, made it clear that it would maintain tight control over the renminbi even after scrapping the dollar peg.

The nuanced nature of the move reflects Mr Wen's wider strategy, which generally involves lengthy and agonising study of an issue with, for the most part, a cautious decision at the end.

The premier's love of studious preparation is reflected even in his rare news conferences, with officials favouring journalists who agree to disclose their questions in advance - and Mr Wen responding with what sound suspiciously like memorised ­recitations.

The approach means even dramatic moves are seldom much of a surprise.

"Following the usual pattern, Beijing has adopted a 'radical' policy, of breaking the US dollar peg, but implemented it in a very gradual way," says Andy Rothman, a China strategist at the CLSA brokerage in Shanghai.

However, Mr Wen, whose role as premier gives him responsibility for managing China's fast-growing but fractious economy, has a politician's instinct for dressing up even gradual decisions as decisive. As a result, China got the headlines it wanted, highlighting the break with the greenback alongside the long-awaited revaluation.

The announcement, Chinese analysts contend, is precisely what Washington has been demanding of China in order to puncture the swelling bilateral trade deficit.

"The revaluation reflects the positive stance China has taken towards the US, as the Bush administration and Congress have kept complaining about their surging trade deficit," says Song Guoqing, an economist at Peking University.

"If China's one step back leads to a similar concession from the US, then a balance will be struck. But confrontation will follow if the US makes further demands."

The timing of the announcement is important, as it comes just before Hu Jintao, China's president, travels to Washington in September, a trip that otherwise might have been engulfed by congressional criticism of China's exchange rate policy.

But some analysts say the caution shown by Mr Wen and China's ruling Politburo of top Communist party leaders has been at the expense of more dynamic and globally savvy policymakers, such as Zhou Xiaochuan, the chairman of the People's Bank.

While acknowledging China's opaque system makes analysing the inner workings of the leadership difficult, Nicholas Lardy, an expert on the Chinese economy at the Institute for International Economics in Washington, says Mr Wen has been a laggard on renminbi policy.

Reflecting a view shared by many China scholars, Mr Lardy believes Zhou Xiaochuan, the chairman of the central bank, has been advocating change since last year, but has been stymied by the Politburo.

"It has been clear for some time that the central bank and Zhou have favoured some adjustment, but they have had a very hard time selling it," says Mr Lardy. "I believe they have been held up by the inclination of the top leaders for a small move, like we saw on Thursday."

Mr Zhou has none of the institutional clout of Alan Greenspan and would make no pretence of enjoying the freedom to act independently of Politburo policy.

Within the constraints of the Chinese system, however, he has carved out a more central, activist role for the PBoC, and not just in monetary policy.

In the past 18 months, Mr Zhou and a number of key lieutenants have moved to take control of the big state banks from the Finance Ministry. In the last month, the bank has also all but taken over policy to rescue the beleaguered securities sector.

Although not considered to be a consummate politician, Mr Zhou does have deeper financial experience than anyone in the leadership. In between stints at the PBoC, he has headed the securities regulator, run one of the large state banks and also been in charge of the foreign exchange regime.

Mr Zhou's openness is underscored by his support for bringing into the bureaucracy "sea turtles" - foreign-educated Chinese who are so-called because in Chinese the phrase sounds like "returned from overseas", the name given to foreign-educated returnees, who often struggle to find a place in the hierarchical government system.

Some analysts caution against reading too much into Mr Zhou's activism on the currency, saying it reflects as much the responsibilities of the PBoC as it does his personal views.

"The PBoC has been stuck with dealing with the consequences of a failure to revalue, and from a strictly institutional perspective, that is a big hassle," says Victor Shih, of Northwestern University in Chicago.

Mr Wen's cautious approach, however - allowing a headline revaluation, while ensuring it remains small and tightly managed - does reflect his political priorities.

Mr Wen and Mr Hu have studiously set themselves apart from the leadership team that preceded them, headed by Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, by retooling policies in favour of farmers and the working poor. They believed these two groups had been left behind by the high-speed economic growth in the 1990s, and had become a dangerously volatile and destabilising force as a result.

"Wen has always been more concerned about domestic livelihoods, or, if you like, more leftist than either Jiang or Zhu," says Mr Shih.

Mr Wen's skills at performing the high-wire balancing acts needed to survive in top-level Chinese politics are not in doubt.

He was famously present when Zhao Ziyang, then boss and Chinese president, tearfully visited protesting students in Tiananmen Square in 1989, just days before the troops arrived brutally to clear them out.

The late Zhao was purged, whereas Mr Wen survived, and prospered.

These skills have served him well in building the necessary consensus to revalue the currency, a policy change strongly opposed by many lobby groups, especially exporters.

"Wen has done well in co-ordinating interests among pressure groups who support or oppose revaluation," said Zuo Xiaolei, chief economist with Galaxy Securities, one of China's largest brokerages.

Still, in many ways Mr Wen is still stuck very much in the shadow of his more dynamic and charismatic predecessor as premier, Mr Zhu. "If Zhu had been in charge (the revaluation) would have been earlier and bigger," says Mr Shih.

The cautious approach of Mr Wen and Mr Hu is in even sharper contrast to that of past Communist leaders such as late party patriarch Deng Xiaoping, who was still the final voice of authority when China last made a big currency move - a renminbi devaluation of more than 30 per cent.

For many Chinese, political timidity is a minor sin compared with the confidence and decisiveness shown by Mao Zedong, a man capable of happily launching political and economic movements that would destroy millions of lives.

Mr Wen is much more in line with the new era of consensus-based leadership within the Communist party, where no leader now has the political capital to rule alone.

Indeed, caution has so far served Mr Wen very well. But with China's currency and economy still subject to formidable pressures despite Thursday's revaluation, there may come a time when more dramatic action is required. One day Mr Wen may really have to surprise.

LOAD-DATE: July 22, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - DocumentCopyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 23, 2005 Saturday
London Edition 1

SECTION: RENMINBI REVALUATION; Pg. 8

LENGTH: 432 words

HEADLINE: Chinese factories will feel pinch on exports MANUFACTURING:

BYLINE: By ALEXANDRA HARNEY

DATELINE: HONG KONG

BODY:


In its interim report for the six months to March 31, Yue Yuen Industrial, the world's largest manufacturer of branded footwear, said a revaluation of the renminbi would "be a matter of mutual concern among the group and its customers".

As this warning became reality on Thursday, Yue Yuen began calculating the toll on its business. Beijing's 2.1 per cent revaluation will lower operating margins approximately 0.4-0.5 per cent immediately as the group's yuan-denominated costs, such as workers' wages, rise.

"It's difficult for us to do anything (about this) in the short term" because the company's contracts are fixed two to three months in advance, said Terry Ip, director of investor relations.

The revaluation of the renminbi comes at a tough time for Chinese export manufacturers, which produce a growing share of the world's goods. After a year of soaring commodity prices, global trade disputes and intensifying competition, factory profit margins are shrinking. Unless they can negotiate higher prices into their contracts with international buyers, manufacturers face further pressure on margins.

"I lost Rmb200,000 (Dollars 24,660) on yesterday's appreciation," said Sunny Chan, director of Tak Fu Hong Trading, which makes lights for Europe and South America in southern China's Guangdong province. Tak Fu Hong's contracts, denominated in US dollars, are fixed to the end of the year. Mr Chan had expected a revaluation in 2006.

At Add New Technology, which makes DVD players and speakers, profit margins can fall as low as 3 per cent. "The impact (of the revaluation) is huge for us," said Frank Deng, director. "I think the (export) volume will decrease by about 20-30 per cent this year."

Chinese manufacturers' leverage in price negotiations with international buyers is limited because there is always a factory that can do it more cheaply. Larger groups, such as Hong Kong-listed Yue Yuen, which managed to raise its average selling price in the first half to offset some of the higher material costs, have more bargaining power.

"It's impossible to ask the international buyers to accept a higher price," said Zhang Yisheng, director of Chai Da Garment, which produces sportswear for the US market. "The competition is too fierce."

Analysts said one of the reasons Beijing opted for a small appreciation was to protect exporters, which employ millions.

With the timing of further revaluation unclear, export manufacturers said they would explore ways to keep costs down, including expanding production overseas - a sentiment likely to be shared by global companies sourcing from China.

LOAD-DATE: July 22, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - DocumentCopyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 23, 2005 Saturday
London Edition 1

SECTION: RENMINBI REVALUATION; Pg. 8

LENGTH: 774 words

HEADLINE: Investors ready to bet on further revaluations OUTLOOK FOR RENMINBI:

BYLINE: By MURE DICKIE

DATELINE: BEIJING

BODY:


When China scrapped the renminbi's peg to the dollar this week, it tried to reassure doubters by offering answers to hypothetical queries such as "Why introduce reforms to improve the foreign exchange rate setting mechanism?"

But the central bank's unusual Q&A release did little to address the questions highest on many minds: what Thursday's move actually means for exchange rate policy and whether the 2.1 per cent revaluation that accompanied de-pegging is just a prelude to further renminbi rises.

Chinese financial experts said yesterday it was too early to predict with confidence the likely workings of the People's Bank of China's new "managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with reference to a basket of currencies".

But some investors were clearly prepared to wager that the new mechanism, which replaced an effective managed peg to the dollar that had endured since 1994, meant more renminbi revaluation ahead.

In Singapore, one-year renminbi non-deliverable forwards (NDFs) - instruments that allow bets on the Chinese currency - rose to around 7.64 per dollar, a level that predicts further revaluation of over 6 per cent by mid-2006.

"The expected RMB revaluation has started!" crowed analysts at JP Morgan in Hong Kong.

With Beijing widely seen as bowing to international pressure to revalue this week, many observers believe that future US criticism will force further moves - and that pressure could grow quickly if China continues to rack up huge trade surpluses.

"If the 0.3 per cent daily trading limit is not fully used to let the renminbi appreciate (against the dollar), there may be pressure," says Ha Jiming, chief economist at China International Capital. "I personally feel it's possible the renminbi will rise 5 per cent this year."

Peng Xinyun, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, says the People's Bank will interfere in the market to prevent any unexpectedly fast appreciation, but could choose to let the renminbi gradually rise to a"reasonable level" by mid-2006.

"The renminbi revaluation will accelerate the flow of speculative capital into China (so) another adjustment of the rate is very likely in the second half of this year," says Mr Peng.

Such expectations are themselves likely to fuel renewed flows of what the Chinese call "hot money" or "floating capital" - funds moved past China's capital controls for speculative purposes, and a bane of policymakers in recent years.

Some Chinese analysts close to the government are keen to stress that the renminbi is no one-way bet - a point underlined by the currency's slight decline yesterday on the state-dominated foreign exchange market.

Stability has long been a watchword for Chinese economic planners, and leaders have repeatedly waved aside foreign pressure for change, insisting that exchange rates are a matter of national sovereignty.

"From first to last, the Chinese government has insisted on independence and autonomy on the issue of the renminbi exchange rate," the People's Bank said in its Q&A release.

Xia Bin, of the Development Research Centre under the State Council, China's cabinet, waves aside US calls for much greater revaluation by saying the scale of Thursday's move was entirely appropriate - and he warns against assuming that more will come soon.

"I hope that some 'hot money players' and some speculators do not harbour unrealistic fantasies and do not come once again to gamble on the exchange rate system," Mr Xia says.

"I don't think. . . there will be any clear appreciation in the second half of the year. Don't harbour illusions."

Many analysts said it would be impossible to understand China's new exchange rate mechanism until it had been in operation for some months at least, when estimates might be made as to the currency basket adopted by the People's Bank.

However, the central bank could confound such hopes, since it is not clear how tightly the renminbi's level will be tied to the basket.

"In the (central bank) announcement, the word 'reference' was used, (while) words like 'link' and 'peg' were not used. This is a very important point," says Yu Yongding, a member of the bank's monetary policy committee and a longtime supporter of revaluation.

"By using the word reference, the central bank will maintain an important role in determining the exchange rate - that's my personal view," Prof Yu said.

A spokesperson for the People's Bank declined to explain how the exchange rate would be set, but pointed out that Thursday's reform was intended to ease trade imbalances, boost domestic demand and corporate international competitiveness, and promote greater economic openness.

LOAD-DATE: July 22, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - DocumentCopyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 23, 2005 Saturday
London Edition 1

SECTION: RENMINBI REVALUATION; Pg. 8

LENGTH: 641 words

HEADLINE: Singapore sees 'basket, band and crawl' system as template for E Asia MANAGED FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE:

BYLINE: By JOHN BURTON

DATELINE: SINGAPORE

BODY:


Tiny Singapore may have felt a sense of pride, as China and Malaysia have adopted a version of its managed floating exchange rate system after abandoning their fixed currency pegs against the US dollar.

Singapore has used what is known as the "basket, band and crawl", or BBC, system since the early 1980s. The Singapore dollar is managed against an undisclosed basket of currencies of its main trading partners and competitors.

The exchange rate floats within a set policy band, which lets the currency crawl up or down instead of being subject to sharp fluctuations.

John Williamson, a Washington-based UK economist credited with developing the BBC model in the 1970s, has called Singapore "the world's most successful practitioner of a BBC regime".

The Singapore currency system can "serve as a basic template for other east Asian countries", said Kim-Song Tan at the Singapore Management University in a recent paper on regional exchange rate systems.

The Monetary Authority of Singapore has said the BBC policy has given it flexibility in responding to changes in both local and global conditions to maintain export competitiveness and control inflation.

The composition of the currency basket is revised periodically to take into account changes in trade patterns. The secret policy band is also regularly reviewed to ensure it remains consistent with economic changes, with adjustments every six months if needed.

Singapore, whose currency was first pegged to the US dollar and then floated in the 1970s, chose the BBC regime because of a close link between exchange rates and interest rates in a small and open economy.

The city-state has since guided monetary policy through exchange rates instead of directly adjusting interest rates. Inflation has been relatively low at 2 per cent a year since the early 1980s.

Under the BBC managed float, the Singapore dollar has appreciated by about 20 per cent against the US dollar, although its strong currency policy has eased since the Asian financial crisis in 1997. In contrast, the currency has fallen by 40 per cent against the Japanese yen.

Both China and Malaysia's managed float exchange rate systems appear broadly similar to that of Singapore, though details of their operations are sketchy. But there are several differences. The currency trading bands in China and Malaysia are narrower than in Singapore, which means smaller currency movements. China's trading band is also adjusted daily.

The International Monetary Fund has listed about 40 countries that use some type of managed float system. But Singapore officials say their system is in some ways unique since it is also used to control monetary policy, while policy statements provide a clear indication to the markets of where the currency is headed.

Some economists, such as Mr Williamson, have argued that a BBC regime could provide the basis for the eventual adoption of a common Asian currency. Others suggest the system is not widely applicable in spite of Singapore's success.

Barry Eichengreen, an economist at the University of California and a supporter of floating exchange rates, says Singapore has many strengths, such as a well regulated banking and financial system and large fiscal reserves, that many other countries do not have to support a BBC system.

"A managed float system largely rests on gaining the confidence of the markets. Only if other macroeconomic policies are consistent with a managed float will it be a success," says Song Seng Wun, regional economist with CIMB-GK Goh in Singapore.

Economists think China faces a potential challenge in introducing a managed float, since a small revaluation would continue to attract speculative foreign capital in anticipation of further currency appreciation. As a result, China may have to widen its currency trading band to gain market acceptance. Currencies, Page 19

LOAD-DATE: July 22, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - DocumentCopyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 26, 2005 Tuesday
London Edition 1

SECTION: COMMENT & ANALYSIS; Pg. 6

LENGTH: 866 words

HEADLINE: Revaluation set to challenge China's capital controls: Beijing is taking action to minimise the effects of a possible speculative inflow of foreign currency after unpegging the renminbi

BYLINE: By MURE DICKIE and GEOFF DYER

BODY:


Ever since Chinashrugged off the currency crises that swept through Asia in 1997, its capital controls have been praised for keeping its currency steady and insulating the country from economic troubles.

However, China's restrictions on short-term capital movements could now come under a fresh onslaught, following the government's decision to abandon the renminbi's peg to the US dollar and move to a more flexible exchange rate regime.

With Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People's Bank of China, the central bank, signalling that last week's 2.1 per cent revaluation against the dollar was only an "initial step", Beijing runs the risk of provoking a massive inflow of speculative funds.

It is unclear how well the country's increasingly leaky curbs on capital movements will cope. But there is no question that China's government is determined to remain in control.

"Any developing country with a currency that is not international has to be particularly cautious at a time when it is adjusting its exchange rate mechanism," says Mei Xinyu, an expert on currency controls at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Co-operation under China's commerce ministry.

"It's impossible to open up the systems of capital control and exchange rate setting at the same time," he says.

Calculating how much money slips past capital controls is guesswork in any country. It is harder still in China because of the practice of "round-tripping", where companies take funds offshore, only to bring them back for the tax benefits enjoyed by some foreign investments.

China's foreign exchange reserves stand at Dollars 711bn (Euros 590bn, Pounds 408bn), of which some economists say Dollars 100bn is the result of speculative capital inflows.

A government report in February said that between August and December, the authorities raided 155 underground banks involved in trading Dollars 1.5bn in foreign currency. But according to Caijing, an investigative magazine, a government inspection of the banking system last year uncovered 4.3m suspicious foreign currency transactions involving Dollars 1,200bn.

Anecdotal evidence also suggests widespread abuse of the rules. The China operations of cross-border companies can overcharge offshore units for goods, as a way to bring in funds. Ventures can also use investment in new Chinese plant as cover to bring in funds they pump into property or other assets with little connection to their business.

Media reports say some people have bought fake Chinese artefacts as a ruse for bringing in foreign currency.

Meanwhile, late last year, police in the eastern city of Qingdao arrested a South Korean man accused of operating an illegal foreign exchange business that had turnover of Rmb240m (Dollars 30m, Euros 25m, Pounds 17m) a year.

Even if China were to receive substantial capital inflows following the shift in its currency regime, however, some economists say the impact might be limited. Capital controls cannot stop all speculative flows, but they slow them down. China is unlikely to suffer the violent capital movements that have destabilised other developing countries.

The central bank has successfully "sterilised" incoming funds over the last two years with bill issues, restraining inflation. Indeed, overcapacity in many industries means that at present the risk could be deflation.

Moreover, holding renminbi assets might not be the sure bet some investors hope. The stock market has slumped this year and many regional housing markets have cooled.

Many analysts also believe the government will continue to take a cautious approach to the level of the currency, which would mean only modest returns for anyone with money in a Chinese bank.

In spite of the concerns over speculative fund inflows, the biggest worry for policymakers remains the possibility of outflows if the economy slows or the prospects for renminbi revaluation diminish.

Beijing is also nervous of the continuing power of hedge funds that took on Asian central bankers in 1997. For this reason, according to Li Deshui, a member of the central bank's monetary committee, China will not make its currency fully convertible for at least five years because it worries hedge funds may force the renminbi to plunge. "There's more than Dollars 800bn to Dollars 1,000bn of hedge funds in the world and the Chinese financial system is relatively weak," Mr Li said in an interview with Bloomberg. "If the (renminbi) becomes fully convertible it would be attacked by these hedge funds."

To ease upward pressure on the renminbi, Beijing has in recent years allowed business more freedom to export capital, but officials have not stopped worrying about the risks of being too lax.

One reason can be found in the spectacular boom enjoyed by casinos in south-east Asia, which is partly being sustained by Chinese travellers, who are banned from betting at home, illegally taking money out of the renminbi area.

The authorities have begun to take steps to prevent money laundering, requiring banks to report suspicious transactions. Legislation on money laundering is also being prepared. However, experts say many banks lack the operational structure to monitor funds transferred between regions.

LOAD-DATE: July 25, 2005

Thursday, July 14, 2005

21????:�?????�?????????-????

21????:�?????�?????????-????
【打印】 【返回】 【关闭窗口】

Sohu首页 > 财经频道 > 国内财经 > 人民币升值 > 中国维护人民币汇率稳定


21世纪圆桌:“汇率报复案”背后的美国逆差病症


NEWS.SOHU.COM   2005年04月16日09:21  南方日报报业集团—21世纪经济报道



沈艳

麦金农教授

北京大学中国经济研究中心主任林毅夫

陈平

施建淮

  本报研究员 王 梓 主持

  本报记者 陈宜飚 香港报道

 ∪嗣癖疑涤敕褚丫晌桓瞿岩岳淙吹墓驶疤猓苁腔嵩谛涡紊睦嫜沽ο虏欢细∠钟诠诘氖右啊=冢蛭拦我樵旱摹盎懵时ǜ窗浮保吧怠北挥忠淮瓮葡蚋叱薄?/P>

  本月6日,美国参议院以67票对33票通过一项修订条文:假如中国不在六个月内调整人民币汇率,美国就应在贸易方面做出报复行动,对进口的中国产品加征27.5%的惩罚性关税。

  对此,我国外交部发言人秦刚发表评论时表示,中国在完善人民币汇率形成机制方面已做了大量改革工作。人民币币值是否被低估,应从多边贸易情况来分析,而不能只看双边贸易余额。

  在升值与否的问题上,罗纳德·麦金农(Ronald I. Mckinnon)也提供了与中国政府相同的立场。麦金农教授是当代金融理论的奠基人之一,在国际金融领域素有很高的威望,他的理论尤其对发展中国家的金融转型起到了深远的影响,堪称“金融发展之父”。

  2005年4月11日下午,麦金农在北京大学中国经济研究中心万众楼做了题为“东亚美元本位与人民币汇率”的演讲之后,就涉及人民币升值与否的一系列问题,与北京大学中国经济研究中心主任林毅夫、教授陈平、施建淮、沈艳等人进行了探讨;尔后,摩根士丹利亚太区首席经济分析师、董事总经理谢国忠也参与了讨论。是为21世纪北京圆桌第44期。

  “汇率报复案”会伤害谁?

  《21世纪》:对4月7日美国参议院通过的“汇率报复案”,您认为其通过众议院、总统诸环节最终付诸实施的可能性有多大?一旦议案获得通过,会有什么影响?

  麦金农:我并不认为纽约州参议员提出的这项决议能够最终成为法案。这种可能性是非常小的。但是这个决议反映了美国人民普遍持有的一种观点。美国国内制造业的就业机会大量缩水,但是美国人民并不是去责备政府的财政赤字问题,却责怪人民币汇率。

  谢国忠:实际上,这个提案在过去两年来,已经被多次讨论,每次出现的形式都不一样。在美国,有些人认为动用贸易保护主义政策可以迫使中国重估人民币币值,达到使人民币升值的目的。

  首先,我同意麦金农先生的看法,这个提案根本通不过。要知道,中国出口的一美元商品在美国的零售价格接近四美元。美国商人和工人们在这个价值链中占据了75%的份额,而且,有大约一千万的美国工人依赖这种销售差价为生。同时,在标准普尔500指数所列公司中,有5%的利润来自中国商品在美国的销售。可以这么说,如果跟中国的贸易断裂,美国的失业率将急剧攀升,同时美国的股票市场将会急剧动荡。目前正在讨论的这个议案将会对美国经济产生巨大的破坏作用,所以我估计它基本上不太可能获得通过。

  其次,如果中国人民币迫于压力升值,其后果是会面临更大的升值压力。即使人民币升值,也不会增加中国从美国的进口,更不会减少美国公司转移生产基地到中国。原因很简单,中国目前主要从美国进口(低价值的)原材料和设备。而美国长期以来一直限制(高价值的)高科技产品出口到中国,因此改变汇率并不会解决问题。中国原材料的主要供应商并不是美国,而是澳大利亚和加拿大等国。

  此外,即使人民币升值,跨国公司也不会从中国抽身返回美国,因为中国的工资和美国相比极为低下,只有美国的5%,甚至更低。因此,如果中国改变了汇率,但是美国并没有得到它所要求的结果的话,美国人会要求得更多。如此下去,在这场游戏中,中国会无穷尽地受到来自美国方面的升值压力。

  中国已经成为全球第三大贸易国,而与此同时,随着中国的发展,全球经济也明显地随着中国的壮大而有所变化。对其他国家来说,有更便宜的商品可供选择当然是件非常好的事情,它可以使其他各国的生活水平大大提高。

  不过,需要注意的是,这也需要其他经济体在劳动力就业市场方面更有弹性,以避免当地劳动力市场的压力。美国的劳动力市场是富有弹性的,它的失业率相当低。因此,从这个角度看,和中国进行贸易对美国人来说是非常有利的。但是,许多人仍然想指责中国,说它应该为美国的贸易逆差承担责任——这种说法完全错误。

  《21世纪》:在“汇率报复案”背后,基于美国经济本身的真实原因何在?

  谢国忠:美国的贸易逆差来自于过度的消费,随着房地产价格不断上升,美国人大举借债度日。可以说,即使美国没有和中国产生大量的贸易逆差,它也会跟其他国家产生大量的贸易逆差,这是美国借债消费的必然结果。因此,要治疗美国的逆差病症,更主要在于让美联储更积极地提高利率,控制房地产市场的过热现象。

  《21世纪》:中国国内的金融市场目前还在进一步改革之中,各位认为现在人民币升值的条件是否已经成熟?

  谢国忠:中国的银行系统是非常脆弱的,一直以来不断地有事件发生,人们一直担心金融体系会瘫痪。现在的问题是,虽然大家都知道中国金融体系有问题,但外界并不知道中国金融体系的问题到底有多严重。我认为,除非我们明确中国金融体系问题的严重性,并且可以控制银行风险,否则对于中国而言,改变汇率都是一件风险极高的行动。

  麦金农:有关中国的金融市场条件,首先,中国有惊人的国民生产总值,因此中国是发展阻力最小的经济体,所以中国的金融系统能够在很广泛的范围内运作,不像拉丁美洲的金融被压抑在很小的范围之内。但是中国缺少一个成熟运作的证券市场,中国必须用至少10年的时间构建成熟的证券市场。但这并不是说,在证券市场完善之前中国都不能够改变汇率制度。

  汇率制度变革的历史经验

  沈艳:国际货币基金组织(IMF)认为发展中国家随着经济的发展应该逐渐从固定汇率过渡到自由汇率,而您也表示中国可以将汇率的波动空间放宽到上下2%。这两者之间究竟有何区别?关于波动的幅度的问题,为什么您不建议一个更宽的浮动空间,比如10%?

  麦金农:IMF认为各国应该逐步放开金融市场,也就是说在金融市场还不完善的阶段采取固定汇率制度,而当金融市场比较成熟之后就可以选择更加灵活的汇率制度了。

  国际货币基金组织(IMF)成立于1945年,当时它成立的初衷就是促进汇率稳定,主要就是想避免19世纪20-30年代出现的汇率剧烈波动。如果IMF现在试图推动东亚国家采取更加灵活的汇率制度,那么它实际上就是改变了它建成时性质和目的。何况汇率应该是一个国家货币政策的中心,对于那些金融市场还没有完全开放的国家来说更是如此。

  我并不同意IMF所提出的结束固定汇率制度而逐渐转向浮动汇率的观点,我觉得中国完全可以维持现状。

  至于上下各1个百分点的浮动空间,这仅仅只是从央行转换到商业银行过程中便于清算的一个汇率变化空间,我想这个空间使银行有足够的利润动机去完成清算过程。中国8.28的汇率是非常成功的。超过10年的8.28的汇率创造了巨大的信度,保持这个汇率的稳定性当然是有价值的。我认为,不能通过扩大这个空间来破坏8.28的可信度;扩大的汇率空间有可能掩盖事实上的升值。

  林毅夫:问题是在有很大的投机压力下,允许汇率浮动,只要上浮的空间不够大,必然使汇率停留在上浮的顶端,其结果又是变成固定的汇率,而且,这样又会引来更多的投机。我赞成在没有投机压力下,采用麦金农教授的建议,但在目前的情况下,最好还是维持8.28的汇率不动,直至投机压力消失为止。

  至于在固定汇率下央行也可以允许商业银行收取一定费用,而把外汇结算的工作转移到商业银行,您说的让商业银行靠赚取汇率变动的差距,只是把外汇结算的工作转移到商业银行的可能方式之一,而不是唯一的方式。

  陈平:在英国和美国的鼎盛时期他们采取的也都是固定汇率体制,比如金本位。在拉丁美洲金融危机期间国际货币基金组织的立场也一直是稳定汇率体制。然而在亚洲金融危机之后IMF的立场却发生了180度大转弯。因此我想问,到底是什么原因让国际货币基金组织的立场发生了如此巨大的转变?对此您如何判断?

  麦金农:回答这个问题要追溯经济历史和经济思想发展历程。在二战后,美国是拥有完善的金融市场、对汇率没有控制、资本自由流动的唯一国家,因此美元被自然地选作世界贸易体系中的中心货币。以美元为中心货币可以在国际贸易中减少各国的交易成本,但另一方面也要求美元足够的强劲,后来我们发现美元的表现并非如此。

  20世纪50年代期间,当时的固定汇率体制非常成功,世界经济发展得非常快。当时有种流行观点,就是说通货膨胀率和就业率之间有种此消彼长的关系,因此,不应该用统一的固定汇率体制来把这些国家捆绑在一起,这样会限制住各个国家自己的货币政策。那时有很多人支持采取浮动的汇率制度。

  1990年代东亚很多国家发生了金融危机,这引发了关于汇率制度的争论。国际货币基金组织认为危机的原因在于这些国家的固定汇率鼓励了过度的借贷,经常账户逆差,导致积累了大量的美元、日元外债。国际货币基金组织认为在危机后不可再有任何形式的钉住美元的汇率制度。

  但结果发现,从2003年至今,东亚发生过危机的国家以及未发生危机的经济体都重新采用了软性钉住美元的汇率制度。中国大陆和香港则是采取了刚性钉住美元的汇率制,甚至日元对于美元的波动幅度也减小了。与此同时,东亚的国家大部分保持了经常账户的顺差,中国大陆地区甚至保持了国外直接投资(FDI)的净流入。

  而现在人们又从贸易角度来讨论浮动汇率问题,大部分人都接受这种观点,但事实上这种观点是错误的,我们有必要寻找正确的模型来解释这一问题。

  人民币不必也不该升值

  《21世纪》:随着布雷顿森林体系的式微,我们可以期待一个怎样的世界货币新体系?

  谢国忠:中国的经济发展需要建立一个独立的、不受外力控制的货币体系,这个货币体系应该独立于其对外贸易。这就需要对银行系统进行产权改革,并且进一步开放资本市场。要做到这一点,需要有经济制度方面的改革与支持,例如,政府部门应该减少并最终不再对投资加以限制。应该说这是个非常长期的、而且是非常艰难的过程。因为中国现在非常依赖外贸,银行系统的坏帐过多,又需要发展出口为国家赚取外汇,之后把这些钱注入银行体系中,使之继续运转。

  麦金农:针对美元本位和东亚地区贸易顺差的问题,杜雷(Dooley)等人提出了自己的看法。他们认为这是一个“复活的布雷顿森林体系”。东亚汇率被人为地低估,从而产生贸易顺差。而这些国家政府通常认为出口会促进经济的“发展”,尤其是在制造业内。为了达到这样的目标,东亚国家政府宁愿投资于低收益的美国国债,同时引入高投资利润率的美国直接投资。而另一方面,美国政府由此获得了足够的资金为其财政赤字融资。最后,他们认为,由于上述的原因,美国当前的经常账户逆差不必在近期内扭转。

  我认为,在当前的体制下,美元作为国际货币使得世界贸易和支付的效率提高。而当美国价格水平稳定时,周边国家将钉住美元以稳定其价格水平——特别是与美国有着紧密贸易联系的东亚国家。因此,理论上如果名义汇率保持不变,各国价格将收敛到相对购买力平价决定的水平,不存在汇率被“低估”的问题。如果东亚汇率分几次升值或是改为浮动汇率制,对于净贸易余额的影响仍是不确定的,即不能保证经常账户顺差消失。另外,任何的本币升值都将减缓本国的经济增长并最终导致通货紧缩。还有可能使本国失去信用,以后无法将汇率固定在任何一个水平上;浮动汇率制更会导致东亚货币的美元价值不断呈螺旋上升。

  关于浮动汇率制,业界存有两种相互矛盾的观点:一方认为浮动汇率制有助于净贸易顺差向净国际资本流入转换;另一方则认为浮动汇率制可以稳定国内价格水平,其方式为引发货币工资增长以平衡各国生产率增长速度的差别。我认为第一个的观点是错误的,并且对开放经济具有误导性,我个人赞成第二种观点。

  在固定汇率制下,美元是关键货币,即大部分的贸易都用美元定价并按市场定价。在相对购买力平价下美国的价格水平是稳定的。而在受固定汇率限制的贸易部门,工人首先通过谈判获得工资的增长,他们货币工资的增长实际上反映了可贸易部门生产率的增长,随后其他部门的工资也会连带地获得增长。从美日两国1950年到1971年名义工资增长变化和汇率的比较中上述论点得到了很好的证实。

  而在浮动汇率制下,当汇率发生波动时,相对购买力平价并不时时成立。同时,汇率不再能够根据世界通胀率稳定国内价格水平,因此需要独立的国内(需求面)货币政策。此时,基于生产率收益的货币工资谈判不再重要,谈判者无法判断汇率变化时国内通胀率的走势,不可预期名义工资的增长趋势;可贸易部门也不再充当工资决定的现行部门。

  施建淮:如果我们一次性调高人民币汇率,此后一直保持在这一水平上,也就是说继续采取固定汇率制度,那会怎么样呢?

  麦金农:当然在最开始的时候出口额会有所下降,但是长期影响是难以确定的。事实上你这个观点和华盛顿国际经济学研究所一些学者的观点非常类似他们就认为中国应该一次性调高人民币汇率大约25%。

  而我认为,提高人民币汇率一点点就可能会带来严重的影响比如说可能失去人们对中国政府承诺的信任而且这会另人们形成未来汇率会更高的预期。

  我认为人民币不必升值。可信且固定的人民币对美元汇率可以通过以下方式来平衡其国际竞争力,例如稳定了中国的国内价格水平;带动货币工资的增长,从而弥补劳动生产率在中美间的差异;保持相对于周边国家的货币汇率的稳定性等等。汇率波动会扰乱货币工资增长的国际调整作用,日本的经验便证实了这一点。我认为外国对人民币施加升值或浮动的压力是具有误导性的。

  林毅夫:我也同意这种观点,如果纯粹从经济的角度来看,人民币的汇率不必升值。但是,现在美、日等国都把他们国内经济的困难全部归罪于人民币币值的低估,而许多政治人物和绝大多数群众是不懂经济的,跟他们讲从经济学的角度如何看这个问题,等于是对牛弹琴,更何况还有不少经济学家也支持人民币币值低估的观点。

  为了避免中国在国际上被认为是“坏孩子”,也许有必要在适当的时候将人民币上升个3、5个百分点,然后就固定在那个地方。这样对中国的外贸和经济不至于有多大影响,但是会有利于改善中国经济发展的国际环境。

  施建淮:现在中国面临着大量热钱涌入的问题,那么,中国如何才能让外国投资者们相信人民币会继续保持稳定,从而阻止热钱的涌入?

  麦金农:我觉得导致这一问题主要有两个原因。首先在2003-2004期间美国国内利率水平太低了,降低了投资者对美元资产的需求,如果2005年美国利率上升到原来水平的话,这一问题可能就会有所缓解。第二个原因就是人们的预期:人们一直在谈论人民币很可能会升值,这种预期就会导致大量热钱流入中国,很容易会导致预期的自我实现。所以最好我们从现在开始就不要谈论人民币升值的问题了。

  “两难美德”与“流动性陷阱”

  《21世纪》:支持人民币不必升值的理论基础在于您的“两难美德”理论,您如何从“两难美德”概念得出不升值的主张呢?

  麦金农:所谓的“两难美德”主要是指“高储蓄两难”。一般来说有美德的人总是进行大量的储蓄,东亚的国家储蓄率相对较高,而两难美德的意义就在于,对高储蓄率的国家而言,他们若保持经常账户顺差并向外贷出美元,随着其美元储备的增加,外国会抱怨他们的贸易顺差是不公平的、是由于高储蓄国家被低估的美元汇率造成的。而另一方面,本国的美元持有者则会担心对于本币的升值期望不断加强会带来持续的本币购买,最后导致本币升值。在这两方面的持续作用下,本国的利率会不断下调,最后接近于零。在这种条件下,一旦抛售美元购买本币的风潮开始,政府就会陷入两难的境地。如果不断升值就会导致严重的通货紧缩,直至最后陷入零利率下的流动性陷阱,正如70年代以后的日本;而如果不升值则会引发外国的贸易制裁。“自由浮动”的汇率制更会导致本国货币的无限螺旋形上涨。

  以日本为例。从上世纪70年代到90年代中期,日元在主要贸易伙伴——美国的压力下不断升值,但经常账户还是维持顺差。这一现象的原因在于,汇率变化仅仅决定了本国的通胀情况,而无法直接决定贸易平衡。在金融开放的经济体中,汇率并不能决定进出口。为了维持资产组合的平衡,日本金融机构需要美元的回报率较高。但在汇率可波动的条件下,这样的风险更高。而美元的回报率不是由日本决定的,因此日元资产的利率被不断拉低,直至1996年底陷入零利率下的流动性陷阱。

  陈平:对于流动性陷阱对中国的威胁,我并不认同。因为在中国,虽然储蓄率相当高,官方利率很低,但是中国的“灰色利率”是很高的。因此农业以及中小型企业都很难获得贷款。这其中的原因在于,中国的生产力提高得很快,技术革新相当快,这是巨额贷款需求的根源。因此我认为就算人民币汇率发生改变,在20年内中国也不会出现流动性陷阱。

  麦金农:即使是非官方利率非常高,还是有可能会出现流动性陷阱问题。如果中国银行之间的利率像日本一样降到零,这就意味着中国人民银行失去了影响经济的能力,它不再有任何值得交换的东西来影响经济发展。所以货币管理问题还是会相当严重的。

  中国和日本并不完全类似。中国相对于日本而言,具有一个很大的优势:人民币汇率能够并且已经可信地维持在当前的水平上,同时不影响其国内价格。而另一方面,中国也有本身的劣势:中国的FDI净流入比日本大很多。FDI可被视为非流动性负债,但同时增加了中国的流动性美元储备。

  林毅夫:就这一问题我想补充一下。日本的利率降到零是在1995年以后,而实际上从1990年以后日本的汇率虽然上下波动的很厉害,但是,不再有明显的下降趋势。因此,把日本的零利率归因于高储蓄两难所导致的货币升值预期似乎与事实不符。我认为日本的零利率更有可能是由于从1991年开始出现的通货紧缩生产能力过剩,导致投资机会不足而形成的。

  单一美元还是一篮子货币

  《21世纪》:您如何理解东亚各地区钉住美元的政策形成?

  麦金农:在1998年以前,东亚还有部分国家经常账户逆差,包括印度尼西亚、韩国等,日本、新加坡、台湾地区则一直保持顺差,中国大陆则变动较大。1998年后,大部分东亚国家经常账户都一直保持顺差,整个东亚地区的经常账户顺差达到3355亿美元。而美国的经常账户从1990年代开始就维持逆差状况,2004年已经达到6613亿美元。这是一个巨大的鸿沟。

  东亚的经济体拥有充足的财政和货币手段来实现自身的汇率目标,但难以独立实现国内的通货膨胀目标。东亚内部的经济一体化程度在不断加深,相互贸易占总贸易的比重达到50%以上。从1980年到2002年,东亚内部的贸易逐年上升,进口、出口都从30%上升到将近50%。而同时,东亚地区与世界其它国家地区间的贸易额在逐年减少。内部整合程度的加深需要一个更稳定的相互汇率系统。从韩国1980年到2002年贸易中使用货币的情况来看,美元的收支都占很大的部分,在80%以上。在进口上,日元也很重要。然而东亚国家多不具备成熟的国内债券市场,再加上远期的外汇市场,使得规避外汇风险愈加困难。另外,值得注意的是,本币升值后,经常账户的顺差并不必然消失,而在浮动汇率制下则更有可能达到这一目标。

  从1980年1月到2004年4月东亚钉住美元的汇率走势来看,中国在1993、1994年前汇率一直低估,1994年后中国的开放程度加大,汇率逐渐保持稳定。香港则在长期内保持了稳定的相对美元汇率,新加坡和台湾地区则情况相似。而在发生过危机的地区,1997年左右不同程度地出现了本币相对美元的贬值,波动较大。

  《21世纪》:对于建立亚洲“货币篮子”的观点,您有何评价﹖

  麦金农:我并不赞成建立货币篮子的观点,这些观点主要是由日本经济学家提出的,他们想在亚洲建立统一的货币篮子。问题是,东亚地区实际上是一个美元区,该地区的国际贸易基本上都是用美元来结算的因此这种构想具体实施起来就会遇到一些问题。毕竟在国际汇市上美元还是发挥了最重要的作用,即使建立亚洲统一货币篮子也没有办法避免美元的影响力。比如说泰国的中央银行按照这种方法储备了一部分的美金、一部分日元,那么随着日元对美元汇率的变动,泰国中央银行就要不断调整美元和日元的储备比率。所以在技术上,这种观点是很难实行的。

  林毅夫:关于建立“货币篮子”的问题我想再提出一些自己的看法。随着欧元的走强,美元作为国际货币的地位正在逐渐减弱,因此在这种情况下我们不采取货币篮子措施,而还仅仅把人民币和美元挂钩,并且再不减少美元外汇储备的话,那么,由于美国的巨额外贸和财政赤字一直不能解决,现在又有可以作为替代货币的欧元,万一有一天大家不再将美元作为储备货币,中国的损失是否会太大?

  麦金农:我想亚洲国家应该一同在稳定汇率方面做出努力,我认为你们可以一起逐渐调高汇率,因为美国国内的通货膨胀率相当高,所以我想这并不会让亚洲国家陷入流动性陷阱。只有在美元很稳定的情况下相对美元调高汇率才有可能陷入流动性陷阱。

  东欧的一些国家的确采取了货币篮子的措施,他们虽然是在欧元区,但是他们和美国之间有很大的贸易往来,所以在他们的货币篮子中是50%美元加50%欧元。在欧洲内部大量交易是用欧元结算的,而很多国际贸易是用美元结算的,这两种货币同时都很重要所以他们完全有理由选择这样的货币篮子,同时持有两种货币。但是在东亚地区跨国交易主要都是用美元结算的,和欧洲的情况并不一样。

  相互汇率稳定对于东亚各国而言具有公共品的意义。由于“亚元”只是一种遥远的可能,要想获得东亚内部汇率的稳定性和价格水平的协调性,钉住美元是唯一可行的选择。联合钉住美元使得稳定美元价格的意义远远超出了对美贸易的范畴,这实际上是一种共同稳定国内价格的强有力的手段。但另一方面,东亚政府缺少定义良好的资产组合目标借以“最优化”其美元储备。当东亚国家不得不面对普遍的国际收支顺差,而美国为逆差时,无止境的储备积累成为实现汇率目标的副产品。

  而对美国而言,政府必须采取有力措施增加私人储蓄率、同时减少联邦政府的财政赤字。美联储应采取紧缩货币政策以缓解美元疲软。但这些措施应该逐步施行,以避免全球经济的急剧衰退。我认为,美元贬值无助于消除经常账户赤字,反而会成为美国国内通货膨胀的先声。

  (实习生刘莉参与整理)

  (独家网络支持单位:搜狐网。21世纪圆桌论坛网上链接:http://business.sohu.com/7/0703/15/column221001584.shtml)

( 责任编辑:田瑛 )


http://business.sohu.com/20050416/n225209170.shtml

搜狐新闻中心24小时值班电话:010-65102160 转6291或65101378;客户服务热线:87710088
Copyright © 2003 Sohu.com Inc. All rights reserved. 搜狐公司 版权所有

??????????? ??????????-????

??????????? ??????????-????
汇率采取钉住一揽子货币 新加坡模式不适合中国


NEWS.SOHU.COM   2005年06月21日07:35  中华工商时报


  人民币汇率改革问题一直是国内外经济界关注的问题,而近来有关人民币升值和汇率机制改革的传闻再度升温。如何看待人民币汇率调整对中国经济的影响,如何选择合适的汇率机制,媒体热炒的新加坡汇率机制是否适合中国?这些问题无不引起读者的兴趣。本报日前与南开大学国际经贸系联合主办的一个研讨会就有关人民币汇率的热点问题进行了讨论。南开大学经贸系是国内研究世界经济的重要基地,其在国际经济领域的研究和教学水平数十年来名列国内大学的首位,也是商务部有关贸易政策的重要咨询机构。———编者

  一、人民币升值和汇率形成机制是不同概念

  刘杉(中华工商时报副总编辑):人民币升值和人民币汇率形成机制改革是两个不同的概念,目前媒体和理论界在这个问题的讨论上存在一些混淆。前者是汇率水平的变化,后者是汇率水平形成的机制,后者决定前者。应该说,在目前状态下,汇率形成机制向更有弹性的方向改变必然会引起汇率水平的上升,但是这并不意味着可以把两个概念等同起来。

  刘百花(浦东发展银行博士后):人民币均衡水平的确定非常困难,长期以来强制结汇的政策造成我们无法准确地判断国内的外汇供求。所以我们应该首先改变外汇的形成机制,采取更为灵活的政策。目前我们在这方面已经做了一些工作,比如外管局颁布了《关于调整经常项目外汇账户限额管理办法的通知》,将境内机构超限额结汇期限由现行的10个工作日延长为90天,自2005年3月1日开始执行。这将有助于我们增加对国内外汇市场真实供求状况的了解。

  张晓东(南开大学国际经贸系博士生):在汇率形成机制不发生改变的情况下,单纯改变人民币汇率水平是一种不明智的做法。首先,我们难以准确地判断人民币汇率的均衡水平,所以很难实现一步到位的调整;其次,如果我们采取频繁、小幅度地升值,市场就会形成人民币不断升值的预期,从而致使即便调整到了均衡状态,人民币升值压力仍然存在;最后,如果我们在不改变汇率形成机制的条件下单纯提高人民币汇率以图缓解国际压力,那么在将来再次出现贸易不平衡时,国际上要求我们提高汇率的压力将会更大。但是,如果我们对人民币汇率形成机制进行了改革,比如采用了更有弹性的方式,我们就可以按照市场规律对汇率进行调整,从而既能达到适宜的水平,又能避免汇率剧烈变动对经济的冲击。所以说,目前我们首先应该完善人民币汇率的形成机制,然后让汇率水平在这种机制的作用下进行调整。

  二、人民币汇率改革错过最佳时机

  薛敬孝(中国世界经济学会副会长、南开大学国际经贸系教授、博士生导师):汇率是不同货币之间的相对价格,所以应该符合市场经济的规律。在各个国家经济发展不平衡的情况下,汇率的变动是一个必然的趋势。经验告诉我们,大国快速经济增长必然导致汇率的升值,我们在《大国快速经济增长引致汇率走强的理论与实证分析》一文中通过对日本、德国的研究再次证实了这个观点。所以在中国经济迅速增长的情况下,人民币的升值是一个必然的结果。但是应该说,我们已经错过了人民币升值的最佳时期。因为目前我国存在数额巨大的热钱,据估计已经超过了1000亿美元。热钱主要可能集中在房地产市场,所以在这种情况下调整汇率必然会造成热钱迅速外流,对国内经济造成很大冲击。我们目前应该采取的措施是利用宏观经济政策限制热钱的进入、减少热钱数量,比如通过降低房地产价格挤出或者是“锁住”热钱,从而使我们可以在更为宽松的情况下对人民币汇率形成机制进行改革。

  徐复(南开大学国际经贸系副教授):美国等国认为中国不具备市场经济国家条件的原因之一是中国的汇率制度不符合市场经济规则,但是在W TO条款中并不含有对汇率政策的规定。从另一方面讲,中东的许多国家也采取了钉住美元的汇率制度,美国却并没有对此进行指责,也没有质疑其市场经济国家地位。由此可见,美国所持有的是一种完全从自身利益出发的没有依据的观点。国际上认为人民币汇率必然升值的理由主要有两个:一是中国长期存在的巨额国际贸易顺差;二是我国6000多亿美元的高额外汇储备。我们必须看到这主要是中国特殊的经济发展状况决定的。从贸易上讲,加工贸易在中国的贸易方式中居于第一位,占到50%以上,所以实际上的贸易顺差要远远低于数字结果。从外汇储备上讲,我国长期以来采取的强制结汇政策,造成了外汇储备以一种十分透明的状态不断增加,而其他一些国家则是一种“藏汇于民”的情况,其外汇储备处于一种隐形状态。

  陶江(南开大学国际经贸系副教授):中国目前还没有建立人民币远期外汇市场,所以国内企业无法防范外汇暴露造成的风险。而且,在目前国家承担了全部外汇风险的情况下,我国企业还缺乏规避汇率风险的意识和经验,弥补这一缺陷也需要一个过程。另外国内利率水平还没有市场化,这也是制约汇率改革的一个重要因素。

  王增业(中石油财务公司博士):外向型经济的长期增长应该主要是投资导向的,我国目前低层次出口的路径依赖对经济的长期稳定增长不利。出口商品的低附加值、低技术含量造成了我国贸易条件的恶化。所以汇率升值虽然会对出口造成不利影响,甚至使一些企业陷入困境,但是这本身就是市场选择的结果,有利于整个社会效率的改善。而且,在我国石油资源严重紧缺、大量依赖进口的情况下,人民币升值无疑有助于满足我国快速增长的石油需求。

  曾令波(复旦大学博士后、国联安基金高级理财顾问):在当前状态下,人民币汇率问题成为了一个政治问题。在美国,强烈要求人民币升值的是劳工

  组织,而不是国际投资者,这主要是一个利益分配的问题。真正促使美国要求人民币升值的一个重要因素是我国对美国高科技产品贸易也开始出现顺差,这在美国人看来是违背了国际分工的规律。但是我们应该看到,出口到美国的高科技产品绝大部分是跨国公司生产的,所以这是一种“两头在外”的情况,中国只是中间的加工环节,当然我们至少还是获得了增加就业和提高技术的机会。目前来看,我们可以在保持名义汇率不变的情况下,采取其他方式对国际收支进行调节,从而缓解国际上的升值压力,包括:对出口进行控制,限制那些对国外相关产业造成巨大冲击的行业的出口;控制FDI的流入,将税收提高到与国内企业一致的水平。另外,在媒体和理论界的讨论中很多人认为我们目前的处境和“广场会议”之前的日本相似,必须指出的是,当时的日本已经早已进入发达国家行列,而当前的中国是远不可能与之相提并论的。

  蔡卫光(南开大学国际经贸系博士生):在相关条件不具备的情况下贸然升值,游资会迅速变现出逃。这不仅会对宏观经济造成负面影响,而且会导致人民币出现走低的趋势,也就是说升值后可能短期内又会面临贬值压力。而此时如果央行采取干预措施稳定汇率,在游资规模过大的情况下会有耗尽外汇储备的危险,这样会进一步降低公众持有人民币的信心,使得人民币迅速贬值,“东南亚金融危机”可能在中国上演。

  刘杉:的确,人民币升值错过了最佳时机。如果早在两年前,就不会有那么大的游资压力。由于很多人将升值与调整汇率机制混为一谈,导致舆论反对人民币升值的声音比较大。如果采取先调整汇率波动浮动,导致人民币升值,然后再改变机制的政策,则对中国金融体制的冲击就不会太大。其不仅可以缓解贸易纠纷,也减轻了输入型的通胀压力。目前看,只有在房价稳定下来后,才可能采取调整人民币汇率的政策。这样做的目的是避免套利热钱撤离后,对金融体系和整体经济带来冲击。

  三、人民币汇率机制应采用钉住一揽子货币,新加坡模式不适合中国

  薛敬孝:采取钉住一揽子货币,同时设定一定的浮动区间应该是人民币汇率形成机制改革的最佳方式。我国的贸易和国际投资主要是以美元计价的,所以美元在这个货币篮子中的权重应该较大。同时,与我国对外经济交往密切相关的日元、欧元等货币也应该占有一定的比例。这种安排对稳定我国的国际收支将起到较好的作用。同时一揽子货币本身就存在一个自我稳定的机制,可以抵消外部经济扰动对我国经济的影响。在确定了人民币汇率形成机制之后,我们需要注意的一点是汇率水平的调整必须是稳健的,汇率调整的“一步到位”是不现实的,德国的渐进式调整和日本的大幅度调整所带来的经济后果是截然不同的,所以我们不应该在升值压力非常大的情况下对人民币汇率水平进行幅度过大的调整。

  陶江:人民币汇率形成机制的改革是一个必然的趋势。我也认为应该采取钉住货币篮子的形式,采取更为灵活的操作机制。

  刘沛志(南开大学国际经贸系副教授):在国际社会强烈要求人民币汇率升值的情况下,我们转为钉住一揽子货币是否能够满足外界的要求?人民币升值压力是否能够就此消失?答案可能是否定的,因为钉住货币篮子往往缺少一种政策的透明性,所以在此情况下国际社会很可能会要求人民币兑美元的名义汇率有更大幅度的升值。

  蔡卫光:如何选择更有弹性的汇率制度比人民币升值更重要。但央行有些政策是反其道而行之的,比如对资本账户的部分开放虽然可以在短期内缓解人民币升值压力,但在长期却不利于人民币汇率制度的改革。而在资本账户相对封闭的条件下改革汇率制度能够避免游资大规模流动的冲击,成本会比较小。

  张晓东:最近媒体热炒中国汇率制度改革将采用新加坡模式。我对东亚国家的汇率机制进行了比较研究,我认为,新加坡是一个小的城市国家,其货币政策目标比较简单,其隐性钉住一揽子货币的汇率机制不适合中国这样的大国。

  四、人民币升值对进出口和外资影响不同

  刘沛志:人民币汇率的升值压力主要是一个全球经济不平衡的问题,从这个角度讲,人民币汇率对美元的升值幅度不应该低于10%。应该说人民币汇率升值10%-15%,对我国的贸易不会产生太大影响。从出口上看,我国的加工贸易比重很高,国内附加值不高,所以升值对出口影响不大。从进口上看,升值对进口的影响大概只有3%。另外,中国不能一直像以前的“四小”那样以出口导向为自己的发展模式,因为中国的经济规模要大得多,仅仅依靠出口的拉动是无法实现经济的长期增长的。

  徐复:制定汇率政策的依据应该是国家的根本和长远利益。应该说人民币汇率升值对外贸的影响还是很大的。据我了解,天津市外贸企业的出口换汇成本约为7.5元,这说明在现行汇率水平下这些企业是略有盈余的,而如果人民币兑美元汇率升值10%以上,这些企业将大多面临亏损。另外,人民币汇率升值还会导致国内劳动力成本的升高(以美元计算),这样在存在很多水平相当的竞争对手的情况下,我国对外资的吸引力将会下降。

  韩燕(南开大学国际经贸系博士生):目前我国的贸易顺差很大程度上是“两头在外”的加工贸易的结果,这也决定了它对非贸易部门的带动作用是很小的,所以加工贸易的减少对我国的影响可能就更低了。对国际直接投资来说,目前我国的FDI很大一部分是属于市场导向型的,所以升值带来的成本提高对其影响可能并不大。另外,资本过度流入一定程度上加剧了我国粗放型经济增长的问题,在当前情况下已经不利于我国经济的长期发展。

  五、人民币升值可以避免“悲惨的增长”

  薛敬孝:应该说目前钉住美元对中国经济是有利的,因为美国是我们的主要贸易对象,我们的其它贸易伙伴国和竞争国中也有很大一部分是采取钉住美元的汇率制度的,而且国际投资也大多是通过美元进行的,所以维持现行汇率有利于中国发展国际贸易和引进外资。但是现在的水平是无法长久维持下去的,无论采取何种形成机制,人民币汇率一定会出现升值。汇率的波动会给贸易,国际投资带来较大的不确定性,从而可能影响到它们的发展,这一点大家在上面已经谈了很多,我不再详细阐述了。需要指出的是,金融部门的完善程度是经济发展成熟与否的重要指标,也是实施汇率改革的关键前提,我国目前的金融体系还比较脆弱,问题很多,所以为了减少汇率改革给国内经济造成的风险,我们一定要健全金融体系,在其他政策上与汇率改革进行配套。

  张晓东:人民币汇率升值的影响可以从利弊两个方面来看,首先谈谈积极意义。升值可以缓解我国目前外汇储备过高的问题。外汇储备增长过快加大了央行对冲基础货币的压力,这不仅是一种成本很高的操作,而且大大限制了央行的货币政策空间,制约了其调控经济的能力。另外,我国也面临着外汇储备低收益率和外来投资高收益率之间的矛盾,一方面以较高成本引进外资,另一方面又以很低的收益把外汇投放到美国

  债券市场,这对我国来说是个整体上的福利损失。汇率升值一个更重要的意义是可以改善目前国内存在的资源配置的扭曲现象。汇率低估的后果之一是增加了出口部门(主要是制造业)的利润,因而制造业部门吸引资源的能力大大加强,这样就遏制了其他产业的发展。我国目前的产业发展已经存在严重的不平衡,第二产业比重过高,第三产业发展严重滞后,这一问题必须得到解决。

  人民币升值对经济的不利影响主要体现在短期上,主要是对金融部门的冲击。应该说,人民币汇率的升值很可能导致热钱的外流,这些热钱通过投资收益、汇率收益两种途径将会大大增值,所以流出的热钱数量应该远高于初始的规模。再加上金融市场上非常常见的“羊群效应”,国际货币的更大规模逃逸应该是不可避免的。这样,一方面房地产市场会进一步缩水,从而导致银行坏账增加,风险加大;另一方面国内的货币总量会出现波动,增强了价格水平的不稳定性。此外,人民币汇率升值也会导致投资于国外资产的银行账面资产价值减少,不利于银行改革的进一步实施。所以,我们必须首先完善国内金融体系,为下一步的人民币汇率形成机制改革做好准备。

  陶江:汇率调整有助于调整国内的经济结构,特别是调整贸易结构,减少资源型的出口,改善贸易条件,避免国际经济学提到的“悲惨的增长”

  背景链接:

  新加坡有管理的浮动汇率制度的特点

  □张晓东

  新加坡采取的有管理的浮动汇率制度具有四个特点:(1)选择一揽子货币作为新加坡元汇率的管理参照,货币篮子的组成包括新加坡的主要贸易伙伴和竞争对手,各种货币所占权重取决于新加坡与该国家的贸易依赖程度。新加坡货币当局以贸易加权的名义有效汇率对新加坡元汇率进行评估和管理,货币篮子的组成不对外公布;(2)新加坡货币当局给新加坡元的名义有效汇率设定的是一个不公开的波动范围(称为政策带),而不是一个固定的数值,从而使汇率制度具有承受短期汇率波动的灵活性,同时也为难以准确测定的新加坡元均衡汇率水平提供一定的评估缓冲区间;(3)对货币篮子的组成周期性地进行修订,以符合新加坡贸易模式的变化;政策带也周期性地进行调整,以与经济基本面保持一致;进行政策性调整的周期通常是3个月左右;(4)在出现现实的汇率超出政策带的情况下,新加坡货币当局通常会进行“逆风干预”,以使汇率重新回到政策带的范围之内。然而,这种干预并不是规范性的。有些时候,货币当局可能选择故意将现实汇率留在政策带以外一段时间,以使货币政策达到更好的效果。由于当局并未公布政策带,所以引发单向投机的可能性不高,所以这种做法的风险不大。

  新加坡在实际制定和执行汇率政策的过程中,对通货膨胀水平并没有设定一个固定的目标,通常认为1%-2%的水平是比较合适的。对于货币篮子,尤其是货币政策带的选择,不是僵硬地依靠模型计算,而是注重中期目标,通过经济基本面、价值判断、市场技术指标,尤其是汇率历史剖面来综合评估。虽然货币篮子包括众多货币,但货币当局的汇率干预仅通过对新加坡元兑换美元汇率的干预来实施,从来不采用对其他交叉汇率干预的做法,原因是新加坡元兑换美元的市场更具流动性。

  新加坡政府在制定汇率政策时一个重要的指导原则是:汇率目标不能与经济基本面长期偏离。从理论上讲,汇率政策的可行性与经济状况的要求并不矛盾,当新加坡的经济基本面好时,新加坡元就会面对升值的压力,一个强势的新加坡元,可以降低经济过热的压力;相反,当新加坡经济基本面不好时,新加坡元就会面对贬值的压力,一个弱势的新加坡元,可以减低通货膨胀的风险,刺激出口和经济复苏,这也符合货币政策的需要。

  新加坡的实践经验表明,对这样类似的小型开放经济体,将汇率政策作为货币政策的中心,的确能够取得维护物价稳定的较好效果。在布雷顿森林体系末期的1970-1973年,新加坡的年平均通货膨胀率保持在3%以下。发生在布雷顿森林体系瓦解后的第一次石油危机给新加坡经济发展带来了巨大冲击,新加坡也和许多工业化国家一样出现了滞胀,新加坡的通货膨胀率在1973年和1974年分别达到了19.5%、22.4%。发生在1979-1980年的第二次石油危机给新加坡通货膨胀水平带来的影响相对较小,1979-1981年的通货膨胀率分别为4.1%、8.6%和8.2%。把实现适宜的汇率水平作为货币政策目标以后,新加坡在维持物价水平方面取得了惊人的成绩,1982-2003年的平均通货膨胀水平为1.51%,最高通胀率为1982年的3.8%,最低为1998年的-1.4%。即使在亚洲金融危机的冲击下,新加坡1997-1999年通货膨胀率仅为2%、-0.3%、0.4%,尤其是在1998年的亚洲金融危机高峰期间,新加坡是该地区为数不多的保持了正的增长率和低通胀率的国家。可见,新加坡根据自身经济特点制定的通过调节汇率稳定物价的政策取得了明显的效果。


搜狗(www.sogou.com)搜索:“人民币升值”,共找到 371,240 个相关网页.

( 责任编辑:田瑛 )


http://business.sohu.com/20050621/n226019351.shtml

????????? ???????????-????

????????? ???????????-????外汇局长暗示了什么 学者揣汇率改革方案完稿


NEWS.SOHU.COM   2005年07月14日11:32  中华工商时报


  说话听声、锣鼓听音。胡晓炼虽然对人民币汇率只说了一半的话,不过听起来也还是意味深长。

  日前,国家外汇管理局局长胡晓炼就人民币汇率改革发表了看法,其中透露出的含义值得琢磨。

  胡晓炼实际透露出三个内容。

  第一个内容:人民币汇率改革首先要改汇率形成机制。胡晓炼说,汇率改革的目标是面向市场,使汇率更有弹性,而不是单纯推动人民币升值。对胡晓炼的话可以理解为,人民币将会放弃钉住美元的汇率机制,而改用更有弹性的钉住一揽子货币的汇率形成机制。与钉住美元单一货币相比,钉住一揽子货币更为复杂,人民币汇率的形成将会受到欧元、日元、英镑、瑞士法郎和美元等主要货币的市场供求变化的共同影响。可以确定的是,人民币汇率改革在主动性、渐进性和可控性三大原则下,会采取渐进改革的过程,但汇率形成机制的调整将先于人民币币值的重估。

  第二个内容:人民币重估后必然升值,中国外贸面临结构性调整,中国出口战略将发生变化。尽管胡晓炼没有谈及人民币一定升值,但她希望中国企业增强竞争力的提醒,其实就暗示了人民币币值的变化将影响到贸易结构和企业竞争力。胡晓炼称,人民币汇率形成机制的长远发展方向是减少行政管制,更多发挥市场调节作用,企业应该提升产品质量和企业竞争力。

  在汇率由市场化因素决定的情况下,汇率的波动幅度会加大,企业规避汇率风险的能力受到挑战。这一方面要求金融市场增加金融工具,为企业避险提供条件。同时也要求中国企业换个活法,在坚持价格竞争战略的同时,提高产品附加价值,提升品牌知名度,最终改变现有的出口结构和竞争方式。

  而胡晓炼暗示的第三个内容则是,国家外汇管理局将鼓励中国企业进行海外并购活动。胡晓炼的说法是,中国外汇储备增加很多,政府会支持企业提高国际竞争能力。政府的支持当然就是体现在外汇额度上。为中国企业购买先进技术和设备提供外汇支持,这自然不是什么新政策,而对中国企业海外并购进行政策支持,才是胡晓炼的话中之意。事实上,中国企业近来在海外的并购活动已经大幅增加,有国际投行估计,下半年中国企业会在海外掀起一个并购高潮。

  我在此前《中海油帮人民币减压》和《揣着人民币去买美国》两篇评论中都提出,政府应鼓励中国企业进行海外并购,这样做既可以减少外汇储备,为人民币汇率改革创造外部条件,也可以把人民币当“准国际储备货币”使用,从而获得“铸币税”。胡晓炼的暗示,表明外汇管理当局早已意识到,海外并购可以给中国带来巨大的好处。

  从胡晓炼的锣鼓音中,我们可以听出,央行正在为人民币减压寻找办法,而且已经找到了,用用还好使。还可以听出,人民币汇率改革方案已经完稿,只等着“出其不意”地宣布。

搜狗(www.sogou.com)搜索:“汇率”,共找到 3,897,287 个相关网页.

Monday, July 11, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Copyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

June 24, 2005 Friday
London Edition 1

SECTION: COMMENT; Pg. 19

LENGTH: 786 words

HEADLINE: China's currency is its own business SAMUEL BRITTAN

BODY:


Western statesmen have every duty to remind Chinese leaders of their still appalling human rights record - from the Tiananmen Square massacre to the occupation of Tibet and the continued veneration of Chairman Mao, who has been exposed as a killer on the level of Hitler and Stalin.

Unfortunately, they have gone quiet on these issues and have instead lectured the Chinese on the need to revalue the renminbi. It is not as if China were making a mess of its economy. On the contrary, it has a higher growth rate than any country in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. And, far from appealing for handouts from the west, it is one of the main sources of the financial inflows sustaining the US economy.

My "hands off the renminbi" view rests on general political economy grounds. Chinese economic policymakers may or may not be right in pegging their currency against the dollar and accumulating massive reserves. Some China watchers can find technical grounds to justify it, while others regard it as a diversion of resources that should be used to boost the living standards of ordinary Chinese. There is, in fact, a strong general case for allowing major currencies to float. But until the Chinese feel ready for this leap into freedom, any currency change would probably do more harm than good.

There is a high chance that a moderate increase in the renminbi parity would sooner or later be felt to be inadequate; and if the markets had seen the renminbi soar once they would know that it could soar again. A compromise sometimes suggested is a widening of the margins around the present or a new parity. This would not help if the margins were modest. For it would not take long for the market rates to come up against the ceiling or floor. But if the margins were extremely wide - like the 15 per cent on either side that surrounds the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, which theoretically still exists - the system would be a farce.

The history of the international currency system since the breakdown of Bretton Woods, when US President Richard Nixon severed the dollar's link with gold in 1971, provides a mine of evidence. After a period of unwilling floating, the main western countries tried to rebuild a system of "fixed but adjustable" exchange rates in the Smithsonian Agreement of 1973. But it did not take long before the dykes fell in, following another shift of sentiment against the dollar. Since then, critics of US policy have switched between arguing that the dollar is too strong and too weak - and indeed it has shown large fluctuations.

What the critics have not discussed is whether the movement of the dollar has been a safety valve that prevented far worse ills from besetting the world economy. The view that the dollar was too high led to the Plaza Accord of 1985, which was associated with a fall in the US currency. Whether this was due to the Plaza or the continuation of a trend, is still disputed by monetary historians. In any case, within a year and a half the worry changed to one that the dollar was falling too much and the Louvre Accord tried to shore it up. Around that time we saw the rebirth of schemes for target exchange rates with wider margins and easier parity revisions. But these were all swept away, following the Wall Street crash of 1987 and subsequent bickering among the summit countries. The currency crises that affected sterling in its period inside the ERM, and the euro strains now apparent, should be a caution about setting up another fixed rate system.

The renminbi issue is one aspect of the imbalances that are claimed to exist in the world economy. There is an international surplus of attempted savings that accounts for the supposed "puzzle" of low long-term bond rates. But within this overall savings glut, the English speaking countries, and especially the US and UK, save very little by historical standards, while east Asian countries and perhaps the eurozone save too much. A resolution of these imbalances would involve currency changes but who knows what they should be? Who would have thought that the British economy would have prospered for so long with a rate for sterling regarded as too high by most currency economists? If the savings behaviour at the root of these imbalances were to change, the currency corrections would take care of themselves. But if a partial stab were attempted - for instance, a move by the US and the UK alone to increase savings - then the results would all too likely be a depressive influence in the world economy too severe to be handled by bond rate changes. Meanwhile, the Chinese should be left to continue liberalising their financial system until they feel able to float the currency.

LOAD-DATE: June 24, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Copyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

June 28, 2005 Tuesday
London Edition 1

SECTION: COMMENT; Pg. 23

LENGTH: 695 words

HEADLINE: China exposes America's national insecurity

BODY:


Great powers seem to need foreign demons. For the US, the Soviet Union and Japan fitted that role for much of the second half of the last century. Now it is China's turn. The paroxysms of anxiety unleashed by the bid by China National Offshore Oil Corporation for Unocal seem oblivious to reason or facts.

America's China-bashers claim a CNOOC takeover would imperil US security. Yet Unocal is a second-tier oil and gas company, most of whose production is in Asia and under long-term contract to customers there. CNOOC has said it will operate Unocal's US business at arm's length and sell it, if Washington so requires. Even if the US bought Unocal's Asian oil, it lacks enough west coast refineries to process it. So much for scare stories about China meeting its energy needs by filching US supplies.

Critics also complain it is unfair that China can bid for US companies, when the latter cannot acquire Chinese state-owned enterprises. Yet Beijing is desperate to sell the two thirds of the equity the state still owns in China's 1,377 listed companies, in an effort to speed stock market reform. US investors are spoilt for choice. Most, knowing the quality of most SOEs, are wisely keeping their distance.

A third argument is a little more sophisticated but just as muddled. It is that since Bill Clinton decided in 1994 to engage China economically by abandoning the ineffectual US policy of linking trade with human rights, Beijing has failed to change its authoritarian regime. Therefore, it is said, the US should revert to a hardline stance.

A recent e-mail from Professor Peter Morici of Maryland University business school exemplifies this line of reasoning. It says "a well-armed, authoritarian China, bent on subverting global institutions that support democracy and free market values" could easily become "a fascist menace with global reach". The proposed solution: stop "appeasing" China and hit it with trade sanctions until it mends its ways.

It is depressing to think that future US managers are being weaned on this tosh. It is not even historically accurate. Mr Clinton's volte-face, and the US decision in 2000 to guarantee permanent market access for Chinese exports, were prompted mainly by heavy lobbying by US companies anxious to expand in China. Achieving political change there was, at best, a secondary objective.

While China's regime is clearly authoritarian, so is Saudi Arabia's. The latter is governed by a repressive feudal monarchy with an appalling human rights record. It is linked to the export of terrorism. It is so far from being a free market economy that it has still not qualified to join the World Trade Organisation. Yet Washington not only tolerates Saudi leaders, it cossets them.

The US needs to keep the Saudi regime sweet because of its oil. But to assume, as American China-bashers implicitly do, that the US does not need China and can bend it to its own will is self-delusion. The two countries are deeply interdependent. China's need for US exports and inward investment is mirrored by its importance as a prime source of funding for the US budget and current account deficits. To rage about China's designs on a medium-sized energy company, while relying on it to pay for the upkeep of federal government - including its defence programmes - verges on the surreal.

Penalising China's exports and investments would hurt both China and the US. But as Washington's paymaster, with almost Dollars 700bn (Pounds 383bn) in foreign exchange reserves and big holdings of Treasury bills, Beijing could inflict far greater damage on the US economy by dumping the lot. It is unlikely to do so because, unlike its American critics, it knows that cutting off one's nose to spite one's face is senseless.

In truth, the furore over Unocal is not about US national security. It is a symptom of national insecurity. If America wants to be more secure, it should open the door to Chinese investment, not slam it shut. The greater China's involvement in the US economy, the bigger its stake in its success and the more powerful its incentive to avoid bilateral frictions - political as well as economic. Money talks, in more ways than one.

LOAD-DATE: June 27, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document



Copyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

June 28, 2005 Tuesday
London Edition 1

SECTION: LETTERS TO THE EDITOR; Pg. 22

LENGTH: 267 words

HEADLINE: China's obligations in the global financial system

BYLINE: By DESMOND LACHMAN

BODY:


From Mr Desmond Lachman.

Sir, Sir Samuel Brittan makes a persuasive case from the Chinese vantage point as to why they should be left to continue liberalising their financial system until they feel able to float their currency ("China's currency is its own business", June 24).

However, he completely glosses over China's obligations as a participant in the global financial system not to engage in prolonged one-way intervention in the currency market in order to maintain an undervalued exchange rate.

Under the second amendment of the International Monetary Fund's articles of agreement, member countries are free to choose whether to fix their currencies, to float, or to do something in between. However, from its very beginning in 1944, the IMF's articles specifically enjoined countries "to avoid manipulating their exchange rate or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain unfair competitive advantage over other members". The IMF did so against the troublesome experience with the competitive depreciations of the 1920s and 1930s.

Over the past 18 months, China has been intervening in the exchange market at a rate in excess of Dollars 200bn a year in order to prevent its currency from appreciating. It does so despite the fact that its international reserves now exceed Dollars 650bn, or one year of its import payments. If that does not constitute prolonged one-way currency manipulation to maintain an undervalued exchange rate, one has to wonder what does.

Desmond Lachman, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC 20036, US

LOAD-DATE: June 27, 2005